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South-South Trade and Investment: The
Good, The Bad and The Ugly—African
Perspectives
Uché U. Ewelukwa*
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decade witnessed two unprecedented and
significant developments in the global economic landscape—the
emergence of new major global players among developing
countries1 and the development of sound, robust, deepening
and widening economic activity between developing countries.2
The South’s share in global trade is growing steadily and the
South now accounts for an increasing share of global demand.3
* LL.B., Dipl., LL.M., LL.M., S.J.D.; Professor, University of Arkansas School
of Law. Professor Uché Ewelukwa Ofodile is a professor at the University of
Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville. She teaches in the areas of intellectual
property law, international trade law, international business transactions, and
international human rights law. She has been a visiting professor at the
University of Oklahoma Law Center (Crowe and Dunlevy International
Visiting Professor of Law), DePaul University College of Law in Chicago, and
the American University of Armenia in Yerevan, Armenia. Professor
Ewelukwa has received numerous awards and fellowships for her work. For
example, she is a recipient of the Global Justice Fellowship award from the
Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs (CCEIA). Professor
Ewelukwa is a frequent speaker at national and international conferences on
trade and intellectual property law. In February 2011, she addressed a group
of United Nations diplomats delivering a lecture as part of a two-day
workshop in intellectual property for diplomats accredited to the United
Nations at the UN headquarters in New York. Professor Ewelukwa graduated
in the top 1 percent of her class with a Bachelor of Laws degree (LL.B.) from
the University of Nigeria. She also holds a Master of Laws degree (LL.M.) in
international business law from the University College London, another LL.M.
degree in international law from Harvard Law School, and a Doctor of
Juridical Science (S.J.D.) degree from Harvard University.
1. See generally Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming
with BRICs: The Path to 2050, GLOBAL ECON. PAPER NO: 99 (Goldman Sachs,
New York, N.Y.), Oct. 1, 2003 [hereinafter Goldman Sachs No: 99].
2. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Accra, Ghana,
Apr.
20–25,
2008,
Accra
Accord,
para.
7,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//tdxii_accra_accord_en.pdf [hereinafter Accra
Accord].
3. In this paper the term “North-South” refers to the socioeconomic
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Developing countries are now trading with one another more
than at any other time in history. On the investment front,
developing countries are reshaping the world’s investment
architecture with the phenomenal increase in the depth of
outward foreign direct investment (FDI) by these countries into
other developing countries. Increasingly, developing countries
see South-South economic cooperation as “[a] key element in
the strategy of collective self-reliance” and “an essential process
of global economic development.”4 Experts attribute Asia’s
resilience in the face of the global financial crisis, in part, to the
growing significance of south-south trade for the region.5
Today, more than 40% of South Korea’s exports reportedly go to
the BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.6
Hanjin Shipping of South Korea, one of Asia’s biggest shipping
companies, is reportedly threatening the dominant position of
Maersk Line of Denmark and CMA CGM of France in West
Africa and is also poised to conquer South America, a region
presently dominated by European container lines.7 The
company’s chief executive, Kim Young Min, is reported as
saying that a terminal the company opened in Algeciras on the
Gibraltar Strait in southern Spain in July 2010 will be a
“beachhead” for an assault on markets in West Africa and
South America.
The concept of a new geography of trade and investment is
generating much discussion today.8 By some accounts the
centre-periphery relationship between the North and the
division between advanced and wealthy developed countries collectively
referred to as “the North” and the less developed, poorer countries collectively
referred to as “the South.”
4. Ministerial Declaration on the Global System of Trade Preference
among Developing Countries, in letter dated Oct. 11, 1982 from the
Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/37/544, Annex II (Oct. 14, 1982).
5. David Pilling, Asia: More Self Contained, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/172359aa-a4b4-11df-8c9f-00144feabdc0.html.
6. Id. The term BRIC was coined by Goldman Sachs’ economist Jim
O’Neill around 2001 and is used to refer to the four rapidly rising economies of
the world: Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
7. Hanjin Prepares Container Shipping Assault, FIN. TIMES, July 18,
2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1b1eb180-9285-11df-9142-00144feab49a.html.
8. On the geography of trade literature, including the Core-Periphery
model, see generally ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY (Richard
Baldwin et al. eds, 2003); MASAHISA FUJITA ET AL., THE SPATIAL ECONOMY:
CITIES, REGIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1999); PAUL KRUGMAN,
GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE (1991); DAVID LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF
NATIONS (1998).
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South, a hallmark of the old geography of trade, is nearing an
end if not already completely over. The eleventh United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD XI)
opened in June 2004 with an inaugural ceremony and a special
session on “The New Trade Geography: The Role of SouthSouth Trade and Cooperation” at which the President of Brazil,
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and former Secretary General of the
United Nations (UN), Kofi Annan, both talked about a “new
trade geography” in which South-South trade would play a
growing role.9 Increasingly, South-South economic cooperation
is no longer seen as friendship of the marginalized but as an
inevitable consequence of a steady but gradual shift in power
away from the United States and Europe. It is also a shift away
from a trade geography that was largely shaped by
colonialism10 and defined by asymmetric patterns. Although
South-South economic cooperation remains primarily intraregional, inter-regional trade and investment is on the rise as
well.
South-South cooperation has received the blessing of the
UN and the support of the most dominant developing
economies.11 December 19th is now recognized as the UN Day
for South-South Cooperation.12 Within the framework of the
Group of 77 (G-77), China, Brazil and India, as well as
countries in Africa have all endorsed and embraced SouthSouth economic cooperation as a necessary and inevitable
development strategy. Proponents believe that South-South
cooperation “can contribute substantially to supporting
national development agendas and fostering economic growth
and efficiency, including providing new trading opportunities
9. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 13–18,
2004, New Geography of International Trade: South-South Cooperation in an
Increasingly Interdependent World, U.N. Doc. TD/404, (June 4, 2004)
[hereinafter New Geography of International Trade].
10. Jonathan Lynn, Developing Countries Turn to South-South Trade,
REUTERS, Feb. 8, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE5170BC2009020
8.
11. See Position Paper of the People's Republic of China At the 65th
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Sept. 13, 2010,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjsxw/t751986.htm.
12. By resolution 58/220 of December 23, 2003, the General Assembly
decided to declare December 19th United Nations Day for South-South
Cooperation. On that same day, the General Assembly endorsed the Buenos
Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation
Among Developing Countries. G.A. Res. 58/220, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/220 (Dec.
23, 2003).
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and generating benefits of economies of scale for participating
countries, and is particularly important for countries of small
economic size.”13 Asha-Rose Migiro, deputy secretary-general of
the UN, forecasts that “[f]uture historians may well see the rise
of South-South co-operation as one of the key developments of
the early 21st century. Given its vast potential to support the
rise of billions of people from poverty and achieve the
[millennium development goals], it is a change that offers us
great hope.”14 According to the Accra Accord, the main
document guiding UNCTAD´s work that was adopted in 2004
at the UNCTAD XII quadrennial conference, “the new
geography of the global economy has the potential to broaden
the spectrum of multilateral cooperation and to promote the
integration of all developing countries in the long term.”15
Africa has not been left out of the South-South train.
Turkey’s “Opening up to Africa Policy” was adopted in 1998 and
is designed to enhance cooperation between Turkey and
Africa.16 Turkey declared 2005 the “Year of Africa” and the first
Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit convened in Istanbul in
August 2008.17 Launched in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) provides the platform for Sino-Africa
cooperation on a broad range of areas.18 In 2005, president Rho
Moo-hyun of South Korea launched the “Korea’s Initiative for
African development.” The first Korea-Africa Forum was
convened in November 2006. The India-Africa Forum Summit,
the official platform for the African-Indian relations, convened
in New Delhi on April 8–9, 2008.19 The IBSA Trilateral
13. Accra Accord, supra note 2, para. 13.
14. Asha-Rose Migiro, A New Spirit of Solidarity Rises in the South, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d59ea7c-e463-11de-a0ea00144feab49a.html.
15. Accra Accord, supra note 2, para. 7.
16. See generally Serif Bahcecik, Turkey's "Opening up to Africa": A
Passing Fad or A Long-Term Strategy? (Apr. 2, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p360842_index.html. See also,
Mehmet Özkan, Turkey Discovers Africa: Implications and Prospects,
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=mehmetoz
kan.
17. Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit, Istanbul, Turkey, Aug. 18–21,
2008, http://africa.mfa.gov.tr/the-summit.en.mfa.
18. See FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION, www.focac.org/eng/ (last
visited Feb. 23, 2011).
19. The Summit brought together the heads of state and governments of
India and fourteen African countries chosen by the African Union.
Participants discussed future cooperation in a broad range of areas, including
trade, science and technology, and the environment.
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Cooperation20 as well as the recently concluded cooperation
framework agreement between the South African Development
Community (SADC) and the Government of the Federative
Republic of Brazil21 also speaks to the growing linkage between
Africa and other developing countries. There are speculations
now whether South Africa will join the BRIC countries to
create a new truly global grouping that may be called BRICSA
or SABRIC.22 Altogether, the years of 2000-10 saw the laying of
the foundation-stones of what promises to be strategic
relationships between Africa and a host of developing
countries. While it may be too early to assess the long term
development implications of these new relationships, an
examination of their emerging foundations is important and
warranted. Although Africa is on board the South-South train,
one might wonder just how close to the center of the emerging
trade and investment geography the continent really is. The
development and the legal and institutional implications of this
new geography for countries in the continent, particularly the
least developed countries (LDCs), is not yet fully known or
explored.23 This paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature. To
the extent that trade and FDI together with sound governance,
development aid, and effective global and national policies can
be transformative, growing Africa-South economic cooperation
has development implications for many countries in Africa and
must be constantly scrutinized.
This paper examines, from an African viewpoint, the
benefits as well as challenges of South-South cooperation.
Answers will be sought to several questions including:
1. Is South-South economic cooperation good for Africa and
should African governments scale up efforts to seize the
opportunity presented by this revival of South-South
cooperation?
2. Does South-South cooperation offer real opportunities for
20. IBSA TRILATERAL OFFICIAL WEBSITE, www.ibsa-trilateral.org/ (last
visited Feb. 23, 2011).
21. Press Release, Southern African Development Community, Press
Release on the Signing of Agreements in Brazil, http://www.sadc.int/index/bro
wse/page/729 (last visited March 5, 2011).
22. South Africa Wants to Join BRICs Club, THE MARKET ORACLE (Aug
28, 2010), http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article22265.html.
23. Least Developed Countries: Country Profiles, UN OFF. HIGH REP. FOR
LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES &
SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES, http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/
(last visited March 5, 2011).

EWELUKWA - Final Version

518

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

4/22/2011 6:17 PM

[Vol 20:2

countries in Africa to reduce poverty, grow their
economies, and integrate into the global economy?
3. Does South-South trade and investment provide
opportunity for Africa’s structural transformation? Is
Africa-South trade replicating the unhealthy pattern of
trade between Africa and the North, which has Africa
locked in as exporter of commodities and importer of
manufactured goods?
4. How might African governments proactively exploit and
maximize the benefits of South-South trade and
investment while minimizing the attendant risks,
dangers, and challenges?
5. Will South-South trade contribute to a more balanced
and equitable process of global economic governance
and development?
The paper focuses on South-South trade and investment
cooperation and does not delve too deeply into cooperation on a
host of other areas. The paper focuses primarily on bilateral
cooperation arrangements between Africa and other developing
countries. The reason is obvious. Of the three main types of
cooperation arrangements between Africa and other Southern
partners—bilateral, trilateral and regional level cooperation—
the bilateral arrangements are the most developed.24 This
paper will focus particularly on China-Africa trade and
investment relations. The reason for focusing on Sino-African
relations is also obvious. Compared to other Africa-South
arrangements, China-Africa relations are the most advanced in
terms of the volume of trade and investment involved, the level
and quality of cooperation on a broad range of subjects, and the
quality of the implementing mechanisms.25 As of 2008, two-way
trade between China and Africa exceeded US$100 billion. The
past decade has also seen Beijing substantially increase
development assistance to Africa, deliver on debt cancellation
24. Bilateral partnerships describe relationships between Africa and a
single developing country, such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation or
the Turkey-Africa Cooperation. A trilateral arrangement stems from
cooperation involving a country in Africa and two other developing country
partners, e.g., the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA). Interregional
arrangements describe arrangement between Africa as a block and other
regions, such as the Afro-Arab Cooperation or the Africa-South America
Strategic Partnership.
25. Uche Ewelukwa, Trade, Empires and Subjects: China-Africa Trade: A
New Fair Trade Arrangement or The Third Scramble For Africa?, 41(2) VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 505 (2008).
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commitments, and open the Chinese market further to products
from Africa.
The paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 provides
an overview of the history, evolution and trends in South-South
economic cooperation generally. Section 3 examines the
participation of Africa in South-South trade and attempts to
explain trends in Africa-South economic relations in the past
three decades. Section 4 focuses particularly on Sino-Africa
trade and identifies past and present trends in the unfolding
arrangement. The good, the bad and the ugly aspects of AfricaSouth arrangements are evaluated in Section 5. Section 6 offers
suggestions and ideas on how to move the Africa-South
dialogue forward taking into account Africa’s long term
strategic interests. The paper concludes in Section 7.
II. ORIGIN, EVOLUTION, AND TRENDS IN SOUTH-SOUTH
TRADE AND INVESTMENT
A new geography of trade is clearly emerging. Under the
old trade geography, countries in the global South served
primarily as sources for natural resources and markets for
finished
goods
manufactured
in
the
North.
The
Center/Periphery trade pattern was reinforced and sharpened
by decades of colonial rule and informed the structuring of the
global economic apparatus. However, the last two decades have
witnessed changes in the landscape of global trade, finance,
and investment that point to a restructuring of the old patterns
of trade. In the last two decades, the South’s share of the world
trade has grown (30% in 2004 up from 20% in the mid-1980s),
the share of manufactures in the export of developing countries
has grown (from 20% in 1980 to almost 70% in 2000), and the
frequency of transnational cooperation from emerging
developing countries has increased as well. Some developing
countries are becoming active players in certain dynamic
sectors of global trade hitherto reserved for the North.
Developing countries are buying more than ever before from
each other, and the income gap between developed countries
and some developing countries has narrowed considerably.
Furthermore, South-South trade is growing at a much faster
rate than North-South trade or global trade and has potential
to grow further. It is speculated that an additional US$15.5
billion in trade would be generated if developing countries
agree to reduce the average tariff applied to each other by
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50%.26
Although the North remains the main architect of the
global economic landscape and the main driver of international
economic relations, judged by factors such as income levels,
share in world trade, pattern of specialization, institutional
considerations, and the size of economic operators, a slow and
quiet transformation is arguably underway.27 South-South
economic cooperation is a not a new phenomenon. What is new
is:
 a move beyond regional and sub-regional boundaries to
inter-regional cooperation;
 greater visibility given to South-South issues in the
programming of global institutions;
 greater rationalization of actions such as better
coordination and harmonization of positions and effort
to establish formal mechanisms for cooperation and
interaction;
 a new emphasis on cooperation within a broader range of
areas including trade, investment, finance, energy, and
health;28
 a new emphasis on strengthening and widening existing
bridges connecting countries;
 greater recognition of South-South cooperation as a
viable tool for economic growth and development;
 a new focus on South-South triangular cooperation;
 a shift away from efforts to fundamentally restructure
international economic relations and create a New
International Economic Order towards efforts aimed at
successful integration into the global economic system;
and
26. Statement by His Excellency Sheik Mohamed bin Ahmad bin Jassim
Al-Thandi, Minister of Economy and Commerce of the State of Qatar, HIGHLEVEL
FORUM
ON
TRADE
&
INVESTMENT
(Dec.
4,
2004)
http://www.g77.org/doha/qatar_minister.htm.
27. New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 10 (“The
primacy of the North in international economic relations, however, will
remain. It will continue to decisively influence developments in the world
economy and trade. The asymmetries between the economies of developing
and developed countries are just too stark, and a meaningful convergence
between the two will need a very long period of time.”).
28. See Marrakech Declaration on South-South Cooperation, para. 2,
Marrakech,
Morocco,
Dec.
16–19,
2003,
http://www.g77.org/marrakech/Marrakech-Declaration.htm
[hereinafter
Marrakech Declaration].
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 a shift away from an overtly anti-Western rhetoric
towards an emphasis on collective self-reliance.29
This section offers an overview of the history, evolution,
and trends in South-South trade and investment cooperation.
A. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE
South-South economic cooperation can be traced to the
Asian-Africa Conference (Bandung Conference) held in
Indonesia in 1955, the Cairo Conference on the Problems of
Economic Development in 1962, the first session of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, and
the Final Act adopted in 1964 following the conference. The
three conferences eventually culminated in the creation of the
Group of Seventy Seven (G-77)30 and UNCTAD in 1964. The
first ministerial meeting of the Group of 77 in October 1967
concluded with the adoption of the Charter of Algiers, which
laid out the challenges confronting developing countries in
global trade and noted that expansion of economic cooperation
among developing countries was “an important element of a
global strategy for development.”31 Since 1964, successive
declarations of the Group of 77 have emphasized South-South
cooperation, including the Caracas Declaration of 1989, the
Cairo Declaration of 1986, and the San Jose Declaration of
1997. By 2003, developing countries saw South-South
cooperation no longer as merely a desirable goal to pursue but
as “an imperative to complement North-South cooperation in
order to contribute to the achievement of the internationally
agreed development goals including the millennium
development goals.” 32 South-South cooperation gained new
momentum
following
the
Asian-African
Sub-regional
29. See generally G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (May 1,
1974) (proclaiming the establishment of the New International Economic
Order (NIEO)); G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3202 (May 1, 1974)
(discussing the Programme of Action on the NIEO); G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974) (discussing the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States); G.A. Res. 3362, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3362 (Sept. 16, 1975)
(discussing Development and International Economic Order).
30. The Group of 77 (G-77) was established on June 15, 1964 with the
adoption of the “Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries” by seventyseven developing countries at the end of the first session of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. See THE GROUP
OF 77 AT THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.g77.org/doc/.
31. First Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77, Algiers, Alg., Oct. 10–25,
1967, Charter of Algiers, available at http://www.g77.org/doc/algier%7E1.htm.
32. Marrakech Declaration, supra note 28, para. 1.
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Organization Conference (AASROC) in Bandung, Indonesia,
from 29-30 July 2003, UNCTAD XI in Sao Paulo in 2004,33
UNTAD XII in Ghana in 2008,34 and the UN Conference on
South-South cooperation in Nairobi, Kenya, in December 2009.
During a High-level segment on “New Geography of
International Trade” at UNCTAD XI, several heads of state
and government concluded that: (a) the centuries-old trade
geography is changing with the South moving steadily away
from the periphery of world economy and trade; (b) developing
countries could provide a steady boost to the growth of
international trade and expansion of the world economy; (c)
given the primacy of the North in international economic
relations, South-South trade cannot and must not be seen as a
substitute for North-South trade; and (d) South-South trade
offers opportunities to developing countries to increase their
profile in international trade.
In conclusion, since 1964, developing countries, within the
framework of the G-77, have adopted programs directed at
implementing
the
vision
of
South-South
economic
cooperation.35 They have also implemented several initiatives
directed at broadening and intensifying cooperation including:
(i) the establishment of UNCTAD;36 (ii) the launch of the Global
System of Trade Preferences Among Developing Countries
(GSTP);37 (iii) the establishment of the Perez-Guerrero Trust
33. See Eleventh Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, São Paulo, Braz., June 13–18, 2004, available at
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Meeting.asp?intItemID=4301&lang=1.
34. See Twelfth Session United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development,
Accra,
Ghana,
April
20–25,
2008,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/meeting.asp?intItemID=4287&lang=1&m=1
3044&info=highlights.
35. These programs include: (i) Program of Work of the Mexico City
Conference on ECDC of May 1976; (ii) the Manila Plan of Action of February
1976; (iii) the Buenos Aires Plan of Action of 1978 (BAPOA); (iv) the Arusha
Programme for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for Negotiations of
February 1979; (v) the Caracas Programme of Action on Economic Cooperation among Developing countries (1981); (vi) the Bali Plan of Action
(1998); (vii) the San Plan of Action (1997); (viii) the Marrakech Framework of
Implementation of South-South Cooperation (2003); and (ix) the Doha Plan of
Action (2005).
36. See Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries
Made at the Conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, Geneva, Switzerland, June 15, 1964, available at
http://www.g77.org/doc/Joint%20Declaration.html.
37. See, e.g., Ministerial Declaration on the Global System of Trade
Preferences among Developing Countries, supra note 4; Ministerial Meeting
on Global Systems of Trade Preferences, New Delhi, India, July 1985,
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Fund for Economic and Technical Cooperation among
Developing Countries (PGTF),38 and the launch of a
Consortium on Science, Technology and Innovation for the
South.39
B. TRENDS IN SOUTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC COOPERATION
The growing importance of the South in the global market
as well as the new dynamism and momentum in South-South
trade underscore developments in the last two decades that
have fueled speculations about the emergence of a new
geography of trade and investment. Two decades ago SouthSouth trade was considered the “weakest segment of world
trade.”40 Today, as producers, traders, and consumers, the
South is becoming important players in the global market
prompting the conclusion, in some quarters, that “the South
represents a future engine of growth and dynamism for the
global economy.” According to UNCTAD:
 The South’s enjoys a 30% share in global trade (up from
20% in mid-1980s;
 Growing interdependence between the South and North
is at a level never seen before;41
 Over the past 15 years, annual FDI outflow from
developing countries have grown faster than FDI
Declaration
on
the
Global
System
of
Trade
Preferences,
http://www.unctadxi.org/Secured/GSTP/Declarations/1985NewDelhi_E.pdf;
Brasilia Declaration on the Launching of the First Round of Negotiations
Within the Global System of Trade Preferences Among Developing Countries
(1986); Tehran Declaration on the Launching of the Second Round of
Negotiations Within the GSTP (1992); São Paulo Declaration on the
Launching of the Third Round of Negotiations Within the Global System of
Trade Preferences Among Developing Countries (2004).
38. See About the Perez-Guerrero Trust Fund (PGTF), THE GROUP OF 77
AT THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.g77.org/pgtf/.
39. The Foreign Ministers of the Group of 77 and China endorsed the
creation of a Consortium on Science, Technology and Innovation for the South
(COSTIS) at the minister's annual meeting in New York City on Sept. 22,
2006.
40. See VIVIANNE VENTURA-DIAS, SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE: TRENDS TRADES
AND OBSTACLES TO ITS GROWTH (1989); see also David Greenaway & Chris
Milner, South-South Trade: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 5(1) THE WORLD
BANK RES. OBSERVER 47 (1990), http://ideas.repec.org/s/oup/wbrobs.html.
41. UNCTAD Secretariat, Doha High-Level Forum on Trade and
Investment, Doha, Qatar, Dec. 5–6, 2004, The New Geography of International
Economic
Relations,
Background
Paper
No.
1,
available
at
http://www.g77.org/doha/Doha-BP01-New_Geography_of_International_Econo
mic_Relations.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD Background Paper 2004].
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outflow from developed countries.
 Developing countries are becoming important and
significant sources of foreign capital in other
developing countries.
 In 2003, developing countries accounted for 6% of the
world’s FDI flows and 10% of the world stock.
 The value of total export of developing economies in
merchandise trade rose from US$4,212.4 in 2000 to
US$6,292.3 in 2005 and US$8,096.9 in 2007.
 Rise in the percentage share of South-South trade in
export of developing countries in merchandise trade
rose from 17.2% in 2005 to 24.0% in 2005 and 27.5% in
2007.
The growing dynamism in South-South trade in
commodities, manufactures, and services is also a remarkable
development of the last two decades. According to available
data:
 More than 40% of export from developing countries go to
other developing countries;
 South-South trade is becoming important in the trade
and development strategies of developing countries;
 Increasing at an annual rate of 11%, South-South trade
is growing faster than North-South trade or global
trade;
 South-South service trade, FDI, and technology transfer
is also on the rise;
 The number of South-South international investment
agreements, including bilateral investment treaties
and double taxation treaties, has significantly
increased; in 2003, 28% of all BITs were those
concluded between developing countries (up from 10%
in 1989);
 The value of the exports of developing countries in
merchandise trade to other developing countries stood
at US$724.0 billion in 2000, US$1,511.0 billion in 2005,
and US$2,230.3 billion in 2007; and
 The percentage share of South-South trade in total world
export of merchandise rose from 11.5% in 2000 to
14.8% in 2005 and 16.4% in 2007.
In conclusion, the last two decades has witnessed a
deepening, widening, and intensification of cooperation among
developing countries in the economic sphere. Developing

EWELUKWA - Final Version

2011]

4/22/2011 6:17 PM

SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE AND INVESTMENT

525

countries are not only trading more with which each other, but
are also investing in each others’ markets. Pointing to growth
in South-South cooperation is a substantial increase in the
number of international investment agreements—bilateral
investment treaties, double taxation treaties, and preferential
trade agreements with investment components—among
developing countries. Since 1964, when the first South-South
BIT was signed, the number of such agreements has grown.
According to UNCTAD, South-South BITs account for 25% of
all the BITs and BITs involving developing countries and
transition economies account for an additional 10% of all
BITs.42 In other words, emerging and developing economies are
not only attracting more investment, but are also becoming big
investors and are investing in other developing countries.
C. IMPETUS FOR SOUTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Several factors explain the growth and renewed interest in
South-South trade in the last two decades.43 These include: (i)
market access barriers and other market entry problems (e.g.
costs) in developed countries;44 (ii) the global recession and
attendant contraction in demand in developed countries; (iii)
the perceived need to explore new complementarities now
arising in South-South trade;45 (iv) developing countries’ desire
to reduce their exposure to movements in demands in
developed countries; (v) the desire of a growing number of
developing countries to collaborate in meeting the challenges of
globalization, trade liberalization, and multilateralism; (vi) the
emergence of new multinationals from emerging economies;
42. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION IN
INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
ARRANGEMENTS,
5,
U.N.
Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/3, U.N. Sales No. E.05.II.D.26 (2005).
43. Several push and pull factors account for the changes in the SouthSouth trade. Among the push factors are: increased competition in domestic
markets, need for raw materials, increased market access opportunities, and
labor costs. Ethnic and cultural ties, as well as geographic ties, are also cited
as examples of push factors. See UNCTAD Background Paper 2004, supra note
41.
44. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, São Paulo,
Braz., June 13–18, 2004, Regionalism and South-South Cooperation: The case
of Mercosur and India, at 13, U.N. Doc. TD(XI)/BP/11 (June 3, 2004)
[hereinafter Case of Mercosur and India].
45. See Chairman of the Group of 77, Letter dated June 5, 1981 from the
Representative of Venezuela for Economic Affairs to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, A/36/333 (June 26, 1981) [hereinafter
Caracas Programme of Action 1981].
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(vii) saturation of demand in developed countries and the need
to search out new markets. The growth in South-South trade is
also tied to purposeful and strategic policies and actions by
emerging developing country economies and their firms, income
growth in some developing countries, heightened mobility of
factors of production and business, changes in demand
patterns, and demographic changes in the North as well as the
South.46
To proponents, South-South trade offers developing
countries immense opportunity for growth and sustainable
development. First, South-South trade offers much opportunity
for efficiency gains and specialization.47 Second, experts believe
that “the potential benefit from freer South-South trade
may . . . be at least as large as the gains that developing
countries can obtain from better access to rich countries’
markets.”48 Third, given the room for even greater expansion in
the future, South-South trade could yield significant gains for
some countries; presently, exports from one developing country
to another account for a mere 6% of the total world
merchandise trade and South-South trade in services account
for a mere 10% of the world merchandise trade.49 Fourth, LDCs
neglected in the globalization process arguably stand a better
chance in South-South arrangements. Fifth, saturation and
shift in demand in Northern market makes it imperative for
many developing countries to search for new markets. Sixth,
South-South trade provides opportunity for countries to break
their dependence on Northern markets and/or cushion
themselves from the changes in those markets. Seventh, it is
also believed that South-South trade provides opportunities for
spillovers in knowledge and technology and opportunities for
developing countries to share experiences and strategies.50
Eighth, at the height of the global financial crisis, South-South
trade provided the only bright spot in terms of growth. In the
aftermath of the crisis, many developing countries now see the
wisdom in turning to their neighbors to bolster trade and
compensate for slumping demand in rich countries and falling
46. New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 8.
47. See Case of Mercoser and India, supra note 44.
48. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
South-South Trade: Vital for Development, POLICY BRIEF, August 2006, at 1,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/50/37400725.pdf.
49. Id.
50. See Case of Mercoser and India, supra note 44.
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commodity prices.51 Overall, developing countries increasingly
see South-South economic cooperation as “a dynamic element
in their development,”52 and “an important contribution to
collective action aimed at equitable restructuring of
international economic relation.”53
D. ENDORSEMENT OF SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE
South-South cooperation has received the support of the
most dominant developing economies including China,54 Brazil,
and India. South-South cooperation has long received the
blessing of the UN as reflected in numerous instruments,
including the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and
Implementing Technical Co-operation among Developing
Countries, General Assembly resolution A/RES/50/119 of
December 20, 1995,55 Resolution 33/134 of December 19, 1978,
Resolution 49/96 of December 19, 1994, and ECOSOC
Resolution 1992/41 of June 30, 1992. Encouragement has also
come from the International Conference on Financing for
Development, held in Monterrey in March 2002,56 and the
World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in
Johannesburg in August 2002.57 UN support is also seen in the
establishment of the UNDP Special Unit for South-South
Cooperation58 and the UN General Assembly’s High-Level
Committee on South-South Cooperation.

51. Lynn, supra note 10.
52. See Ministerial Meeting on Global System of Trade Preferences, supra
note 37.
53. See Belgrade Declaration on the Global System of Trade Preferences
among
Developing
Countries
(1988),
pmbl.,
para
2,
http://www.unctadxi.org/Secured/GSTP/Declarations/1988Belgrade_E.pdf.
54. See Position Paper of the People's Republic of China At the 65th
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 11.
55. G.A. Res. 50/119, U.N. Doc. A/Res/50/119 (December 20, 1995),
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/50/a50r119.htm.
56. Updated information on the follow-up to the International Conference
on Financing for Development can be found at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd
(encouraging South-South cooperation and urging the strengthening of SouthSouth cooperation in the delivery of assistance).
57. The text of the report of the World Summit on Sustainable
Development and information about follow-up action can be found at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/index.html.
58. Who We Are, SPECIAL UNIT FOR SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION,
http://ssc.undp.org/?id=177.
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E. THE PROMISE OF WIN-WIN, MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL
OUTCOMES
Embedded in the South-South cooperation discourse is the
promise that unfolding arrangements will be based on
mutuality of interest and yield beneficial results for all.
According to the Caracas Programme of Action of 1981, “[a]ll
developing countries should be in a position to benefit equitably
from a practical evidence of solidarity.” According to the
Ministerial Declaration on the Global System of Trade
Preferences Among Developing Countries, the GSTP “should be
based on the principles of mutuality of advantages in such a
way as to benefit equitably all participants, taking into account
their respective levels of economic and industrial development,
the patterns of their external trade policies and systems.”59 In
the Ministerial Declaration of 2009, G-77 Member States
stressed that South-South “is a development agenda . . . based
on a strong, genuine, broad-based partnership and
solidarity . . . complete equality, mutual respect and mutual
benefit . . . [and] respects national sovereignty in the context of
shared responsibility.”60
Also embedded in the South’s critique of the dominant
global economic system is a promise that the South-South
arrangement will be different from the North-South
arrangement and will yield more development-dividends. Over
the years, G77 members have expressed concern about:
 the imbalance and asymmetry of the multilateral trading
system;61
 worsening terms of trade for developing countries;62
 the rising tide of protectionism in the developed
countries;63
 stalemate in the North-South negotiations;64
 the problem of trade gap in developing countries;
59. Ministerial Declaration on the Global System of Trade Preferences
among Developing Countries, supra note 4, at 3.
60. Ministerial Declaration adopted by the 33rd Annual Meeting of
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77, New York, U.S., Sept. 25,
2009, http://www.g77.org/doc/Declaration2009.htm [hereinafter 33rd Annual
Meeting of Ministers].
61. See Ministerial Meeting on Global System of Trade Preferences, supra
note 37, para. 2.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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 the possibility of compensatory financing to meet longterm deterioration in the terms of trade;
 the volatility of commodity markets;65 and
 the dismantling of protectionist barriers to the markets
of developed countries.66
In conclusion, the twenty-first century is witnessing
increasing cooperation among developing countries and
renewed efforts to encourage, stimulate, and support SouthSouth cooperation. Although still focused on addressing old
issues, over the years new issues such as sustainable
development, social development and equity and inclusion, the
increased frequency of financial crises, trade subsidies, and the
role of information and communication technologies have
appeared on the South-South agenda.
III. AFRICA-SOUTH TRADE AND INVESTMENT: TRENDS,
MODALITIES, AND MECHANISMS
Africa shares the broad goals of South-South cooperation
including the goals of fuller integration into the world
economy,67 influencing the structure, agenda, and architecture
of international economic relations.68 Joint negotiating
positions on major issues of the multilateral trade
negotiations69 are also shared by countries in Africa. Africa’s
economic indicators sheds light on why South-South trade
holds much attraction for policy-makers in the continent:
 the continent’s share of global merchandise trade is low
and stands at around 3%;
 the continent’s share of global FDI flow is also extremely
low and stands at about 5%;
 the composition of Africa’s export is troubling, exhibiting
unhealthy reliance on primary products and showing
very little manufacturing of value-added products;
65. Ministerial Declaration on the Occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary of
the Group of 77, São Paulo, Braz., June 13–18, 2004, U.N. Doc. TD/405 (June
12, 2004).
66. Id.
67. Marrakech Declaration, supra note 28, at para. 13.
68. 33rd Annual Meeting of Ministers, supra note 60, para. 70 (“SouthSouth cooperation seeks to enable developing countries to play a more active
role in international policy and decision-making processes, in support of their
efforts to achieve sustainable development.”).
69. See Marrakech Framework of Implementation of South-South
Cooperation (2003), art. 3, http://www.g77.org/marrakech/MarrakechFramework.htm [hereinafter Marrakech Framework].
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 According to the Food and Agricultural Organization,
Africa “is the only region of the developing world where
the regional average of food production per person has
been declining over the last 40 years”;
 Africa is the only continent not on track to meeting the
Millennium Development Goals; and
 Africa’s infrastructure deficiency is legendry and the
worst when compared to other regions in the world.
African economies need new markets for their traditional
export and need new arrangements that will advance their
individual and collective goal for export diversification,
industrialization, and structural transformation. South-South
trade and investment also holds the key to the continent’s goal
of expanding trade in commodities, services and investment,
“leapfrogging,” building productive capacities, enhancing
competitiveness, and developing new complementarities.
South-South trade is also a good launching pad for greater
involvement and participation in the global market and offers
immense opportunities for countries in the region to develop
and test new trade-able goods.70
A. AFRICA-SOUTH TRADE: TRENDS AND PATTERNS
Evidence suggests that developing countries are playing an
increasing role in Africa’s trade and investment (Fig. 1). While
not replacing the continent’s traditional partners, key
developing countries, particularly China and India, are
becoming more dominant; China is now considered “the biggest
player in Angola’s post-war reconstruction process,” and has
made inroads in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and
Tanzania.71 In 2006, India’s imports from Africa stood at
US$12.6 billion, up from about US$6 billion in 1999.72 Also as
of 2006, Brazil’s import from Africa stood at US$8.1 billion, up
from about US$2 billion in 1998. Overall, the period from 20002010 saw:
 “a marked shift in the geography of [Africa’s] trade, with
non-African developing countries now accounting for a
70. See UNCTAD Background Paper 2004, supra note 41.
71. See generally, China’s Interest and Activity in Africa’s Construction
and Infrastructure Sectors, CENTRE FOR CHINESE STUDIES (2006),
http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/dfid-3rd-edition.pdf.
72. The African Trading Relationship with India, TRADE LAW CENTRE
FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA (TRALAC), http://www.tralac.org/cause_data/images/1
694/AfricanTradingRelationshipIndia.doc (last visited Feb. 17, 2011).
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much larger share than in previous decades;”73
an increase in the importance of developing countries in
Africa’s merchandise trade;
non-African developing countries trading with Africa
almost as much as developed countries;
a reduction in the share of African trade going to the
continent’s traditional partners in Europe and North
America;
a decline in United States’ share of African trade
compared to the early 1980s;
a decline in European Union share of African export
compared to the mid-1980s.

Figure 1

Source: Computed using IMF Direction of Trade data. Economic
Development in Africa Report 2010.

Developing countries that import from Africa appear to be
primarily interested in commodities. Over the last decade, and
for most major developing country export markets, the share of
total imports from Africa that is made up of manufactured
73. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
REPORT 2010: SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION: AFRICA AND THE NEW FORMS OF
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP, at 29, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ALOC/AFRICA/2010,
U.N. Sales No. E.10.11.d.13 (2010) [hereinafter ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
AFRICA REPORT 2010].
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goods has declined steadily. Primary products account for 80%
of Africa’s export to Turkey, even though the period from 2000
and 2008 saw a slight increase in the share of manufactured
goods in the continent’s export. What is evident then is that
Africa-South trade exhibits strong similarity with Africa-North
trade: the dominance of primary products in the continent’s
export and the dominance of manufactured goods in the
continent’s import.74 Primary products account for 14% of
Africa’s import from the developed world and 22% from
developing countries in 2008, while low, medium, and high
technology accounted for 69% of the continent’s import from
developed countries, and 56% of the continent’s import from
developing countries in 2008.
B. AFRICA-SOUTH INVESTMENT: TRENDS AND PATTERNS
Africa is also benefiting from the boom in South-South
investment. Unlike FDI in other regions, which is frequently
dominated by the private sector, “a particular feature of FDI
from the South to Africa is the frequent involvement of
governments or state owned enterprises.”75 Asia is becoming a
principal player in terms of FDI flow to Africa (Figure 2). In
2008, the top five developing country investor in Africa were:
Singapore (US$9,826 million), China (US$7,804 million), Hong
Kong China (US$5,268 million), Malaysia (US$3,718 million),
and India (US$2,652 million). Indian investment is expanding
beyond Mauritius, its traditional base in the continent, and is
now extending to countries such as Senegal and Sudan.
Although FDI from Latin American countries is low compared
to that from Asia, the influence of countries like Brazil is felt in
many countries in the continent.76

74. Like her import from developed countries, Africa’s import from other
developing countries is dominated by manufactures.
75. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at
81.
76. Id. at 88 (nothing that the Brazil’s energy giant Petrobras has
operations in about six countries in Africa and that Brazil’s mining company
has a presence in seven countries in the continent).
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Figure 2

Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database. Economic Development in Africa
Report 2010.

Perhaps indicating an increase in South-South FDI in
Africa is the increase in BITs and DTTs concluded between
countries in Africa and other developing countries. In 1998,
only 133 BITs were concluded between countries in Africa and
other developing countries, but by the end of 2008, the number
had jumped to 335.
C. AFRICA’S RESPONSE TO SOUTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AGENDA
Countries in Africa appear to fully embrace the SouthSouth agenda and are exploring ways to maximize the
opportunity that South-South cooperation presents. In a 2005
Decision, the Executive Council of the Africa Union
“[w]elcome[d] the third round of the Global System of Trade
Preferences . . . ” and “encourage[d] African countries to engage
actively in those negotiations.”77 In a 2005 speech to the
African Union Commission, the President of Tanzania,
Benjamin Mkapa, argued that Africa must strive to change the
direction of the continent’s trade by ensuring that the continent
77. African Union, Exec. Council, Decision on Trade and Investment in
Africa, Ex.CL/Dec.205 (VII) (2005).
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trades more with Asia and Latin America as a deliberate
continental strategy to diversify exports markets and sources of
investment. According to him:
The time has come for a strategic new geography of trade taking
advantage of enormous natural resources in Africa and Asia, as well
as the rapid development that has made East and South Asia major
markets for manufacturers as well as primary commodities in which
Africa has a competitive advantage. Under these circumstances there
is no reason why, with political will on both sides, countries such as
China and India cannot be major markets for African producers, and
Africa emerge as an important market for basic Asian manufactured
goods, while, at the same time, African manufacturing capacity is
being built with Asian investment I am glad to note that already
China and India are major sources of investment in Africa.78

The first Africa-South America Summit took place from
November 26–30, 2006. In a resolution adopted at the
conference, the Heads of State and Government of Africa and
South America resolved to establish an Africa-South America
Cooperative Forum of State and Government, and also resolved
to “[a]dopt strategies and measures that will translate the
vision of the Africa-South America Cooperative Forum into
concrete economic, political and social benefits for our
peoples . . . [i]mmediately activate and implement all bilateral
agreements between countries in the two regions,” and to
“[i]ntensify cooperation and consultation at all levels to exploit
the immense opportunities which abound in our two
continents.” 79 In a 2005 Decision, the Executive Council of the
African Union “reiterate[d] its commitment for a new and
mutually advantageous partnership with Asia Countries”80 and
stressed the need “to continually engage in active dialogue that
will consolidate and strengthen the partnership between Africa
and Asia.”

78. Benjamin Mkapa, President of the United Republic of Tanzania,
Speech
to
the
African
Union
Commission,
http://www.africaunion.org/VISITS/Tanzania%20Pdt%2031aug05/SPEECH%20BY%20THE%20
PRESIDENT%20OF%20THE%20UNITED%20REPUBLIC%20OF%20TANZA
NIA.htm (Aug. 31, 2005).
79. Africa-South America Summit, Abuja, Nigeria, Nov. 26–30, 2006,
Abuja Resolution on Africa-South America Cooperative Forum (Nov. 30, 2006),
http://chede.org/chede/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/30-12-09-Resolution-offirst-Africa-South-America-summit-in-Abuja.pdf.
80. African Union, Exec. Council, Decision on the Report on the New
Africa-Asia Strategic Partnership, DOC.EX.CL/198 (VII) (2005).
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IV. SINO-AFRICA TRADE: EVOLUTION, TRENDS, AND
PERSPECTIVES
The year 2010 marked the tenth anniversary of the Forum
on China-Africa Trade, the platform for cooperation that has
guided and promoted the development of China-Africa relations
over the past decade. The past decade saw a deepening and
strengthening of China-Africa cooperation on a broad range of
areas. As of 2008, China-Africa trade exceeded US$100 billion,
some 53 African countries were trading with China, and China
had begun the construction of six economic and trade
cooperation zones in Africa. An estimated 1,600 Chinese
enterprises have started business in African countries with a
direct investment stock of US$7.8 billion.81 Also in the past
decade, China’s assistance to Africa doubled, China delivered
on earlier commitments to cancel the debt of the heavily
indebted poor countries and LDCs in the continent, and has
provided concessional loans and preferential export buyer’s
credit for infrastructure and other projects in Africa.82 In
November 2009, foreign ministers from the two sides met in
Sharm El Sheik, Egypt for the 4th Ministerial Conference of
FOCAC under the theme “deepening the new type of ChinaAfrica strategic partnership for sustainable development.”
Speaking at the 4th Ministerial Conference, H.E. Wen Jiabao
stated that China’s plan to cancel US$168 million debts owed
by 33 African countries was near completion, that the US$5
billion of concessional loans will be fully in place soon, and that
the China-Africa Development Fund, whose first tranche
reached US$1 billion, became operational as scheduled. He also
declared that “China [was] ready to deepen practical
cooperation with African countries in diverse areas and push
forward in an all-round way the new type of China-Africa
strategic partnership.”83
A. TRENDS IN SINO-AFRICAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
Today, China is Africa’s largest developing country trade
81. Wen Jiabao, Premier St. Council China, Speech at the Opening
Ceremony of the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (Nov. 8, 2009), http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/zyjh/t627391.ht
m.
82. Yang Jiechi, Minister Foreign Aff. China, Report at the 4th
Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (Nov. 8,
2009), http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/zyjh/t627658.htm.
83. Id.
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partner, accounting for about 11% of the continent’s external
trade, and is Africa’s largest source of imports. UNCTAD
suggests that the expansion of trade between China and Africa
is the main driver of the increasing share of developing
countries in Africa’s trade. Trade between China and countries
in Africa has grown since 2000. Trade volume between China
and Africa stood at US$10 billion in 2000, US$39.7 billion in
2005, and topped US$106.8 billion in 2008—hitting and
exceeding the target of US$100 billion. Annual trade between
Africa and China is now in the region of US$37.7 billion.
Between 1995 and 2009, the China-Africa trade grew by 25%.
The figures are even more dramatic when China’s trade with
individual countries is examined:
 between 2002 and 2005, China-Angola trade increased
by nearly 41.6% from US$1.148 billion in 2002 to
US$6.95 billion in 2005;84
 between 2003 and 2004 Sierra Leone’s export to China
increased from zero to US$1.61 million; and
 trade between China and Tanzania increased by 524%
between 2000 and 2005 to reach over US$475 million.
China’s investment in Africa is also growing and
expanding to involve more sectors. Chinese companies
represent a new and significant source of development capital
for countries in Africa. Between 1991 and 2008, 33% of cross
border mergers and acquisition (M&A) concluded by developing
country TNC’s involved Chinese companies. Since 2000, China
has encouraged Chinese companies to invest and explore
business opportunities in Africa. China has also fulfilled a
promise, made in 2006, to set up a China-Africa development
fund (Cadfund), with funds that will eventually reach US$5
billion.85 Chinese FDI in the first quarter of 2010 increased by
81% to US$552 million. To advance China-Africa cooperation,
four programs of action have been adopted since 2000: (i) the
Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and
Social Development, adopted in October 2000; (ii) the Addis
Ababa Action Plan 2004-2006, adopted in 2003; (iii) the Beijing
84. CENTRE FOR CHINESE STUDIES, CHINA’S INTEREST AND ACTIVITY IN
AFRICA’S CONSTRUCTION AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS (2006).
DEVELOPMENT
FUND
(CADFUND),
85. See
CHINA-AFRICA
http://www.cadfund.com/en/index.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) (noting that
the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFUND) was officially opened on
June 26th, 2007, with first-phase funding, USD 1 billion, provided by China
Development Bank).
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Action Plan 2007-2009, adopted in November 2007; and (iv) the
Sharm El Sheik Action Plan 2010-2010, adopted in 2009. The
China-Africa Cooperation Forum is the platform for dialogue
between the two sides.
B. PRINCIPLES GUIDING CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION
China has repeatedly rejected any notion that there is a
fundamental clash of interests. In 2000, Foreign Minister Tang
Jiaxuan stated: “We have no conflict of fundamental interests.
Rather, we share extensive common interests in safeguarding
peace and promoting development.” In all the exchanges and
documents emanating from the FOCAC, certain core principles
have been repeatedly stressed: political equality, mutual trust,
economic win-win cooperation,86 and balanced two-way trade.87
The FOCAC has also repeatedly endorsed the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence.88
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF CHINA-AFRICA ECONOMIC
ARRANGEMENT
A follow-up mechanism was addressed in the Programme
for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social
Development, adopted in October 2000 at the first Ministerial
Conference. In the 2000 document, the two sides agreed to
establish corresponding committees for follow-up actions of the
Forum on China-Africa Co-operation at the ministerial level
and to set up joint follow-up mechanisms at various levels.
FOCAC is now in its tenth year. FOCAC is described as a
platform “for collective consultation and dialogue and a
cooperation mechanism” with the characteristic of “pragmatic
cooperation” and “equality and mutual benefit.” In the past ten
86. See Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation, FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (Nov. 5, 2006),
http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/DOC32009/t606841.htm (“We hereby
solemnly proclaim the establishment of a new type of strategic partnership
between China and Africa featuring political equality and mutual trust,
economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges.”).
87. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation—Addis Ababa Plan of Action,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, at para.
4.3.2 (Dec. 26, 2003), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/Second/t57032.htm.
88. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan, EMBASSY OF
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, at
para. 4.2 (Nov. 16, 2006), http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/zfgx/zfhzlt/t2
81763.htm.
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years, the FOCAC has concluded four ministerial meetings89
and one summit meeting.90 Monitoring and implementation is
carried out through a multi-level dialogue mechanism as
envisaged in the 2000 Document: (1) the ministerial meeting
every three years, (2) meeting of senior officials every two
years, (3) foreign ministries’ political consultations and
strategic dialogue (now with 28 African countries), and (4)
dialogue between the Secretariat of Chinese FOCAC Follow-up
Committee and African diplomatic corps in China. The Chinese
government established the Follow-up Committee of FOCAC
soon after the first Ministerial conference in 2000. The
Committee is presently made up of 27 members drawn from all
the relevant ministries including the ministry of Commerce,
Finance, Health, Education, Land and Resource, and
Education. It is not clear how many African countries have
established similar follow-up committees.
D. AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON SINO-AFRICA TRADE
Africans leaders have enthusiastically embraced China’s
Africa agenda. In a speech at the Second Political Consultation
between Chinese and African Foreign Ministers, the
Chairperson of the Commission of the Africa Union, H.E. Dr.
Jean Ping, called China “one of Africa’s longest and most
faithful partners” noting that “[t]his partnership has brought
many dividends to both China and Africa, and seems poised to
be even more beneficial in the future.”91 While labor unions and
human rights organizations express skepticism regarding
China’s engagement in Africa, the reaction of policy makers in
Africa has been different. “I can confirm that China has
remained faithful to the commitment it made on issues of
international importance,” Dr. Ping told his audience noting
particularly China’s commitment to complete the new Africa
89. The first ministerial conference of FOCAC was held in Beijing from
October 10–12, 2000. The Second Ministerial Conference of FOCAC was
convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from December 15–16, 2003. The third
ministerial conference of FOCAC was held in Beijing from November 4–5,
2006. The fourth Ministerial Conference was held in Sharm El Sheik from
November 8–10, 2009.
90. The Beijing Summit of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was
held from November 4–5, 2006.
91. H.E. Dr. Jean Ping, Chairperson Comm’n Afr. Union, Speech at the
Second Political Consultation between Chinese and African Foreign Ministers,
2, http://www.africa-union.org/root/ar/index/Speech%20by%20the%20CP-New
%20York-23%20Sept%20%20VERSION%20ANGLAISE%20Discours%20avec
%20les%20Chinois.pdf (Sep. 23, 2010).
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Union Commission office and Conference Center complex.92 In
a remark at the fourth Ministerial conference, the President of
the Republic of Liberia, H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, remarked
that “Liberia considers FOCAC an important mechanism for
She
noted
several
the
development
of
Africa.”93
accomplishments in Liberia thanks to the help from China,
including: contributions to Liberia’s debt relief program under
the HIPC arrangement; the establishment of an Anti-Malaria
Center and medical teams at Liberia’s largest hospital; the
construction of new facilities at the University of Liberia
Campus; a modern hospital in one of Liberia’s rural counties;
an Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center; the
construction of three modern primary schools in high
population communities in Liberia and military barracks;
scholarships to over 100 Liberian students to attend
universities in China; and over 400 commodities identified to
penetrate China markets. Speaking at the same conference, the
Vice-President of Ghana, John Dramani Mahama, commented
that “China’s post FOCAC intervention in Ghana’s socioeconomic development has been remarkable and visible.”94
According to him, “[m]any more Ghanaian entrepreneurs,
business people and students have made China their preferred
destination.”95
V. AFRICA-SOUTH TRADE AND INVESTMENT
COOPERATION: A CRITIQUE
UNCTAD sees the growing relationship between Africa
and Southern partners as “a welcome development.”96 To
UNCTAD, the new arrangements have “great potential to
support the development of productive capacity and contribute
to the achievements of sustained growth and poverty reduction
in the region.”97 A thorough examination of the evolving
92. Id. at 4–5.
93. H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President Liber., Remarks at the Opening
Ceremony of 4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum of China-Africa
Cooperation, http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/zyjh/t632439.htm (Nov. 8,
2009).
94. H.E. Mr. John Dramani Mahama, Vice President of Ghana, Statement
at the Opening Session of the 4th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC,
http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/zyjh/t632435.htm (Nov. 8, 2009).
95. Id.
96. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at
26.
97. Id.
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relationship between Africa and Southern partners suggests
that there are good aspects to these arrangements and
troubling aspects as well. Moreover, any positive dividend is
not automatically delivered but may depend on the extent to
which African economies proactively exploit and maximize the
potential benefits.98 Evaluating the benefit to Africa of AfricaSouth trade and investment is made difficult by the complexity
of evolving cooperation arrangements; most are multi-sectoral
and involve many countries at vastly different levels of
development and implicate multiple sectors of the economy. In
general, China-Africa relation has evolved into a multidimensional cooperation system covering political, economic,
social and cultural aspects. Consequently, a focus on trade and
investment may not adequately capture developments in other
respects.
A. THE GOOD: POSITIVE ASPECTS OF AFRICA-SOUTH TRADE AND
INVESTMENT COOPERATION
1. New Sources of International Capital and New Markets for
Export.
South-South trade represents a new and welcomed source
of finance for most countries in Africa. The fact that some
emerging economies are projected to become the main engine of
new demand growth and spending power in the near future
means that Africa ignores South-South cooperation at its peril.
Projections about the BRIC countries suggest that South-South
trade and investment must become part of Africa’s
development strategy. According to Goldman Sachs, in less
than 40 years, the BRIC economies together “could be larger
than the G6 in US dollar terms and could account for over half
of the size of the G6 by 2025.99 The paper projects that China
“could overtake Germany in the next four years, Japan by 2015
and the US by 2039.”100 In terms of economic growth, Goldman
Sachs also projects that about two-thirds of the increase in the
GDP from the BRICS would come from higher real growth. In
terms of global demand pattern, Goldman Sachs further
98. Id. at 26 (noting that the potential benefits of Africa-South
arrangements “can only be realized to the extent that African countries are
more proactive in the process and use the leverage they have with Southern
partners to persuade them to strike a balance between their commercial or
strategic interests and the region’s development needs.”).
99. Goldman Sachs No: 99, supra note 1.
100. Id.
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projects that by 2025, “the annual increase in . . . spending
power from the BRICs could be twice that of the G6, and four
times higher by 2050.”101 Given declining aid to Africa from
traditional sources, projections of accelerated outward
investment from countries like China will be welcomed news.102
The top 12 EMNCs from China reportedly control over US$30
billion in foreign assets and US$33 billion in foreign sales;103
among developing countries, China is now one of the top FDI
exporters—making it an attractive partner to most African
governments.104 Developing countries are also potential
markets for Africa’s export. Given tariff and non-tariff barriers
in some Northern countries, access to markets in other
developing countries is important to countries in Africa.
Available data suggests that South-South cooperation is
boosting Africa’s trade to developing countries. In 1995, trade
with Africa represented only 1% of China’s total world trade;
the number slowly increased between 1995 and 2006 to
between 3% and 4%. By and large, South-South trade and
investment presents much-needed opportunity for Africa to
diversify its economic partners. Whether this means Africa
abandoning its traditional partners is a more contested issue.
“For Africa’s development and integration we have depended on
the Western world—we cannot continue to proceed like this,”
AU’s economic chief, Maxwell Mkwezalamba, is reported as
saying.105 According to Mkwezalamba, speaking at the AU
Summit in Uganda, “[W]e need to diversify our partners that
we work with and hence for us, working with China is
something that we have welcomed.”106
2. Multidimensional and Multi-Sectoral Partnerships
Unfolding
Africa-South
arrangements
are
multidimensional and implicate multiple sectors of the
economy. South-South cooperation thus offers advantages to
101. Id.
102. See John Wong & Sarah Chan, China’s Outward Direct Investment:
Expanding World Wide, 1 CHINA: INT’L J. 273 (2003) (noting that China’s
economy can sustain significant capital outflow for investment purposes).
103. Id. at 276.
104. Id. at 277 (noting that China’s share of OFDI rose from 0.2% in 1980
to 3.6% in 2001.
105. Ahmed M. Kamara, China Gets Massive Endorsement from the
African Union, NEWSTIME AFRICA (July 25, 2010, 10:50 AM),
http://www.newstimeafrica.com/archives/13409.
106. Id.
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Africa beyond the trade and investment arena. In areas such as
science and technology, rural development, energy and solid
minerals, water resources, and infrastructure development,
there is much that Africa could gain from South-South
cooperation. Within the context of Africa-South America
relations, cooperation and partnership in energy is currently
under discussion. In the Abuja Plan of Action adopted at the
conclusion of the first Africa-South America Summit, the two
sides agreed to “exchange information on how to achieve skills
and technology transfer in the extractive industries,” “explore
the possibility of developing a common energy strategy,” “share
experiences and develop capacity for the exploration of energy
resources and efficient energy marketing systems,” and
“cooperate in the development of alternative sources of energy
and promote the use of renewable energy sources and hybrid
energy technologies.”107 The first Africa-South America (ASA)
Joint Conference of Ministers in Charge of Energy convened in
July 2009 with the goal of moving the agenda forward.108
Reflecting the multi-sectoral, multi-faceted nature of the
unfolding relationship, at the fourth FOCAC Ministerial
Conference, Chinese Premier H.E. Wen Jiabao, announced that
in the next three years, the Chinese government will: establish
a China-Africa partnership in addressing climate change;
enhance cooperation with Africa in science and technology;
deepen cooperation in medical care and health; and enhance
cooperation in human resources development and education.
3. Collaborative Learning and Technology Transfer
Africa-South trade and investment also provides an
opportunity for African countries to address the growing
technology gap through effective and cost-effective technology
transfer arrangements.109 South-South technology transfer has
107. First Africa-South America (ASA) Summit, Abuja, Nig., Nov. 26–30,
2006, Abuja Plan of Action (2006).
108. See ASA Joint Conference of Ministers in Charge of Engery, Addis
Ababa, Eth., July 13–17, 2009, Cooperation & Partnership in Energy Under
the Africa-South America Cooperation Forum (ASACOF): Concept and
Strategy (2009) (“Due to the growing aspirations for close cooperation between
Africa and South America for the sake of sustainable socioeconomic
development of their countries and peoples, the leaders of the two continents
convened in a Summit Meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on 26–30 November 2006
and agreed to promote such objectives in an organized and rapid manner.”).
109. In October 2002, the Group of 77 convened its first high-level
conference on South-South cooperation in science and technology in Dubai,
with the participation of the Member States and more than 150 scientists from
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become more possible as emerging developing countries make
strides in the fields of science and technology. In 2007, China,
for the first time, became the second highest investor in R&D
after the United States. Africa can learn from other developing
countries and “leapfrog” some of the development challenges
the continent is currently facing or will face in the future.
Technical cooperation features strongly in China-Africa
cooperation. In the last decade, China has sent hundreds of
senior experts on agricultural technology to Africa, set up
demonstration centers of agricultural technology in some
countries, and increased Chinese investment in African
agriculture.110 In the Beijing Action Plan of 2006, the two sides
also agreed to “promote cooperation in the development,
application and transfer of technologies.”111 Specifically, China
promised to “continue to provide training courses of practical
technologies and carry out demonstration projects of technical
assistance for extending China’s scientific and technological
achievements and applicable technologies in Africa.”112 In 2009,
China pledged to increase the number of Chinese government
scholarships to Africa to 5,500 by 2012, to train a total of
20,000 professionals of various fields for Africa over the next
three years, and to launch a China-Africa joint research and
exchange program.
4. Preferential Market Access
A new and interesting development in South-South
economic relations is the use of preferential market access
schemes as a foreign policy instrument. Developing countries
such as China are now providing preferential market access to
developing countries. They discussed how to intensify cooperation. The
meeting adopted the Declaration on the Promotion of Science and Technology
in the South. See Group of 77 South-South High-Level Conference on Science
and Technology, Dubai, U.A.E., Oct. 27–30, 2002, Dubai Declaration for the
Promotion of Science and Technology in the South (Oct. 30, 2002),
http://www.g77.org/sshlcst/Dubai-Declaration.htm.
110. See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan, supra
note 88, at para. 3.1.3 (stating that China agrees to: send 100 senior experts
on agricultural technologies to Africa, set up in Africa 10 demonstration
centers of agricultural technology, “give encouragement and support to
Chinese enterprises in expanding their investment in agriculture in Africa
and get more involved in agricultural infrastructure development, production
of agricultural machinery and processing of agricultural produce in Africa”
and “[s]tep up cooperation with Africa in extending applicable technologies
and human resources training in agriculture.”).
111. Beijing Action Plan, supra note 88.
112. Id. at para. 3.7.1.
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products originating from LDCs. Considering that 33 of the 48
LDC’s on the UN list are in Africa, such schemes present an
opportunity for these countries to develop and diversify their
exports. Preferential market access schemes can stimulate
sustained export-led growth in recipient nations. In the Delhi
Declaration adopted at the conclusion of the India-Africa
Summit in 2008, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to
“providing meaningful market access to the Least Developed
Countries.”113 China started to grant zero-tariff treatment to
some commodities of African LDCs destined for China in 2005.
Following the 2006 Beijing Summit, China expanded the tariff
exemption list to 478 kinds of products from African LDCs. In
2009, Beijing pledged to “phase in zero-tariff treatment to 95
percent of the products from the least developed African
countries having diplomatic relations with China, starting with
60% of the products within 2010.”114 It is expected that by 2013,
the tariff exemption list will expand to cover some 4,700
products (up from 478 products in 2006).115
The effectiveness of China’s preference scheme has not
been seriously evaluated. A comparison of China’s market
access offers with similar offers from developed countries such
as the United Kingdom (Everything But Arms initiative
implemented in 2001) and United States (African Growth
Opportunity Act implemented in 2000) is outside the scope of
this paper. China claims that its market access offers has
generated considerable benefits including advancing more than
US$1 billion worth of African exports to China.116 It is not clear
how factors such as non-tariff barriers, cost of documentation,
rules of origin, and China’s preferential scheme to LDCs in
Asia affect the economic potential of China’s Africa preference
scheme. In a 2007 paper, Philip Alves, an economist at the
South African Institute for International Affairs, concluded,
regarding the earlier preference, that:
Chinese authorities have designed a preference scheme well-fitted to
the export capacity of the benefiting African economies, yet it will
likely have only a small economic impact. With an implicit transfer of
113. India-Africa Forum Summit 2008, New Delhi, India, Apr. 8–9, 2008,
Dehli Declaration, para. 11 (Apr. 8, 2008).
114. Id.
115. China Ministry of Commerce, An Interpretation of New Measures on
Economic and Trade Cooperation from the 4th Ministerial Conference, F. ON
CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (May 24, 2010), http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/dfz
c/t696509.htm.
116. Id.

EWELUKWA - Final Version

2011]

4/22/2011 6:17 PM

SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE AND INVESTMENT

545

about US$ 10 [sic] million per year spread across 30 countries, the
estimated economic value is only about 1.2% of these countries’ nonoil exports to China. As Table 2 shows, about half of the beneficiaries
may see an implicit transfer of less than US$ 100,000 [sic] per year.
Barring an incredible supply response in Africa, the preferences will
not much alter the trade flows to China, and certainly will not close
the bilateral trade deficits run by Africa’s non-oil economies.117

The jury is still out on the overall effectiveness of China’s
preference scheme for African LDCs. On the one hand, the
scheme appears to be permanent, is carefully tailored to the
export capacity of African LDCs (some 88% of covered products
are current exports of the LDCs), and the average margin of
preference for products of interest to the LDCs are sizeable
(about 10.4%). On the other hand, some products vital to export
of some African LDCs are excluded (for example, cotton is
excluded), China’s rules of origin are very strict, and African
LDCs still face competition from Asian LDCs for the Chinese
market.118
5. Commercial Infrastructure Development
Africa’s infrastructure deficiency is notorious, longstanding, and implicates almost all forms of infrastructure.
Poor and/or inadequate infrastructure is a major impediment to
Africa’s development, particularly the continent’s goal of
industrialization, diversification, and regional integration.
African leaders now recognize this to be a problem.119 As much
as US$22 billion per year in investment and US$17 billion for
maintenance is needed to address Africa’s infrastructure

117. Philip Alves, China’s Preferential Trade Policy as a Foreign Policy
Tool, in NEW IMPULSES FROM THE SOUTH: CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF AFRICA
28, 36 (Hannah Edinger, Hayley Herman & Johanna Jansson, eds., 2008),
available at http://www.ccs.org.za/downloads/CCS_-_New_Impulses_from_the_
South_-_May_08.pdf.
118. Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries, INT’L
MONETARY FUND (Nov. 2001), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2001/1108
01.htm (noting that preferential access schemes for poor countries have
frequently proven not to be very effective at increasing market access for the
intended beneficiaries because the schemes frequently exclude the highly
protected products of most interest to exporters in the poorest countries and
“are often complex, nontransparent, and subject to various exemptions and
conditions . . . that limit benefits.”).
119. See generally COMM’N FOR AFR., OUR COMMON INTEREST: REPORT OF
THE
COMMISSION
FOR
AFRICA
(2005),
available
at
http://allafrica.com/sustainable/resources/view/00010595.pdf (concluding that
substantial and sustained levels of finance, as much as 5% of the continent’s
GDP, is needed to close Africa’s infrastructure deficit).
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deficits.120 South-South partnership is offering new sources of
infrastructure finance for Africa on a scale now comparable to
traditional official development assistance (ODA) from the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) or to capital from private investors.121 A recent study
found that at least 35 countries in Africa have infrastructure
finance deals with China, Chinese finance “is on a scale large
enough to make a material contribution towards meeting
Africa’s vast infrastructure needs,” and other Southern
partners, including India and the Gulf states, are playing an
increasing role as infrastructure financiers.122 According to this
study, as of 2006, China’s financial commitments to the African
infrastructure project stood at US$7 billion, up from around
US$0.5 billion per year in 2001–03 and US$1.5 billion per year
in 2004–05. The two largest beneficiary sectors of Chinese
finance are power and transport—sectors where the need is
acute and potential benefit could be quite significant. Together,
power and transport account for 66.6% of Chinese
infrastructure commitment in sub-Saharan Africa between
2001 and 2007. Infrastructure development, particularly the
need to develop direct air routes and to rationalize sea routes
between the two regions, is one of the areas of cooperation
identified in the 2006 Declaration of the First Africa-South
America Summit.123 Pursuant to the declaration, the two sides
agreed to “form a basis for mutual exchange and support in the
area of infrastructure development.”124
6. Agricultural Technology
The field of agriculture is one area where Africa needs
urgent help. Africa’s agriculture is in crisis.125 According to the
120. VIVIEN FOSTER, WILLIAM BUTTERFIELD, CHUAN CHEN & NATALIYA
PUSHAK, BUILDING BRIDGES: CHINA’S GROWING ROLE AS INFRASTRUCTURE
FINANCIER FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 33 (The World Bank, Trends & Policy
Options No. 5, 2009) [hereinafter BUILDING BRIDGES].
121. Id. at xi.
122. Id. at xi–xii, xviii.
123. Africa-South America Summit, Abuja, Niger., Nov. 26–30, 2006, Abuja
Declaration, ¶ 29, ASA/Summit/doc.01(I).
124. First Africa-South America (ASA) Summit, Abuja, Nig., Nov. 26–30,
2006, Abuja Declaration (2006), http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/AFRISOUTDEC
L.PDF.
125. The problem is not new, however, and has long been recognized by
African leaders in documents such as the Lagos Plan of Action of 1963, the
Abuja Treaty of 1991, NEPADs, Comprehensive African Agricultural
Development Programme (CAADP), and the Abuja Food Security Summit
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Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Africa “is the only
region of the developing world where the regional average of
food production per person has been declining over the last 40
years.”126 Despite the recognized importance of agriculture to
the economies of most countries in the continent, agricultural
productivity remains low and in decline in some countries.
According to one report:
 Since the 1970s, agricultural imports into Africa have
been rising faster than exports;
 Since 1980, the continent as a whole has been a net
agricultural importing region;
 Africa’s agricultural export feature a small number of
traditional commodities;
 Africa’s agricultural export patterns indicate a strong
dependence on preferential access to a few developedcountry markets.
 In the 1970s, Africa spent less than US$5 billion on
agricultural imports; by 2005, the continent was
spending well above US$25 billion on agricultural
imports.
Cooperation in the agricultural sector is another area that
promises immense dividends to Africa. Since 2000, Beijing has
pledged support for agricultural development in Africa.
Cooperation has come in various forms. At the 4th Ministerial
Conference, Beijing pledged to enhance cooperation by
increasing
the
number
of
agricultural
technology
demonstration centers built by China in Africa to twenty,
sending fifty agricultural technology teams to Africa, and
training 2,000 agricultural technology personnel for Africa.127
Technical assistance in this sector can help Africa address
supply side constraints, boost agricultural productivity, and
attain food security.
Cooperation with China in the field of agriculture targets
some of the pillars identified in the Comprehensive African
Agricultural Development Programme such as Pillar 4
(“development
of
agricultural
research,
technology
Declaration of December 2008.
126. Florence Chenoweth, The Role of Agricultural Development in the
Achievement of the MDGs, MDG GLOBAL WATCH, http://www.mdgglobalwatch.org/florence_chenoweth.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
127. Fourth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation, Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, Nov. 8–9, 2009, Sharm El Sheikh
Action Plan, ¶ 4.1.4 (Nov. 12, 2009).
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dissemination and adoption”) and Pillar 5 (“sustainable
development of livestock, fisheries and forestry resources.”).128
The launch in June 2010 of the Africa-Brazil Agricultural
Innovation Marketplace (Marketplace) offers another example
of promising South-South cooperation in the field of
agriculture.129 The Marketplace is described as a “south-south
partnership to foster agricultural research and innovation for
development by supporting policy dialogue and collaborative
projects.”130
7. Strategic Coalitions and Trade Negotiations
South-South economic cooperation provides an opportunity
for countries in Africa to enhance their participation in the
multilateral trade system through strategic coalitions. In the
last decade, issue-based coalitions have emerged as a feature of
multilateral trade negotiations. African countries have sought
to advance their agenda and defend their interest through
different coalitions including the Africa Group, the LDC Group,
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group, the Group of
33, the Group of 20, the NAMA-11, and the Group of 90.
UNCTAD attributes this developing-country activism for the
incorporation of development issues in the Doha Work
Programme. UNCTAD is also of the view that Africa’s
cooperation with developing countries in multilateral trade
negotiations has helped the continent to influence the agenda
and pace of the Doha Round negotiations and increase their
level of participation in the negotiation process more generally.
Although African countries have increased their participation
in trade negotiations and although it has been increasingly
difficult for developed countries to set the tone, agenda, and
outcome of negotiations, the benefit to Africa of South-South
cooperation in trade negotiations must not be exaggerated. On
128. Initiative in Support to NEPAD-CAADP Implementation, FOOD &
AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/tc/tca/nepad/caadp_en.asp
(last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
129. The Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Marketplace is a described
as a multiparty international initiative involving the Forum for Agricultural
Research in Africa (FARA), the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation
(Embrapa), the United Kingdom Department for International Development
(DFID), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the
World Bank (WB) and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). See General
AGRIC.
INNOVATION
MARKETPLACE,
Information,
AFR.-BRAZ.
http://www.africa-brazil.org/home/about (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
130. FAQ,
AFR.-BRAZ.
AGRIC.
INNOVATION
MARKETPLACE,
http://www.africa-brazil.org/home/faq (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
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the positive side, gains such as the launch of the development
round, the gradual death of the Singapore issues, and the Doha
Declaration on Health and Human Rights would probably not
have come about without strong solidarity by developing
countries. However, on close examination, it could be argued
that the voices of African countries have not been heard on the
most important issues on the Doha agenda; African proposals
on a host of issues have been virtually ignored. Furthermore,
although African ministers have facilitated or co-facilitated
some past WTO ministerial conferences,131 that in and of itself
should not be taken as evidence that the continent is taken
seriously in trade negotiations or that the continent can
influence critical decisions.132
The marked differences in the size and fate of the
economies that make up the developing country group makes
suspect claims that the interests of African countries are
adequately represented in South-South trade coalitions; the
areas of common interest are few and insignificant while the
areas of divergent interests are many and hugely significant.
Issues such as agricultural market access, NAMA, and
preference erosion have in the past divided developing
countries. The argument is not that coalitions in trade
negotiations are not useful or that African countries should not
cultivate links with other developing countries on the many
issues that are on the Doha Development Agenda. However,
Africa must pay attention to areas of divergent interests and
must not hesitate to call out other developing countries when
their position in trade negotiations is likely to harm the
continent’s interests.
B. THE BAD: NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF AFRICA-SOUTH ECONOMIC
RELATIONS
1. Underutilization/Barriers to Trade
Despite the benefits of South-South economic cooperation,
the potential for interregional trade remains underutilized by
countries in Africa. It is estimated that only 27% of intra-South
131. Cancun Ministerial (Kenyan Minister of Trade served as facilitator);
Hong Kong Ministerial (Zambian Minister of Trade and Nigerian Minister of
Commerce were co-facilitators.).
132. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at
46 (suggesting that choosing African trade ministers to facilitate the
Ministerial conference represents “important changes in the WTO negotiation
process in response to the increasing bargaining power of African countries.”).
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trade in agriculture and a mere 12% of intra-South trade in
manufacturing are conducted on an interregional basis.133
Africa’s trade as a share of trade of many developing countries
is still very low: China (10.6%), India (3.5), Brazil (2.6%), Saudi
Arabia (2.4%), Turkey (1.9%), United Arab Emirates (1.4%),
Republic of Korea (1.2%) and Russian Federation (1.2%).
Asymmetries in the economic relations between Africa and key
Southern partners are a major concern and undermine claims
that South-South can lead to win-win outcomes. Nontraditional barriers to trade impede Africa’s export and erode
any benefit the continent might have gained from available
preferential access schemes. One 2004 report found that:
 Average applied tariff of developing countries are above
developed country rates, despite liberalization attempts
in the past decade;134
 Approximately 70% of tariffs that developing country
exporters face are applied by other developing
countries;
 Developing country service trade barriers are also
significantly higher than those of developed countries;
 Compared to developed countries, developing countries
have more incidence of “tariff peaks,” with over onequarter of developing countries having more that 40%
of tariffs at 15% or higher;
 Developing countries’ tariffs in manufacture and
agriculture are particularly harmful to developing
countries’ economies and much welfare gains will be
realized through their elimination.
South African fruit exporters complain of non-tariff
barriers to Chinese markets in the form of sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, costly logistics, a lack of distribution
channels within China, high import tariffs on fruits, cold chain
sterilization requirements and registration of the orchards, and
associated documentation.135 Barriers in developing countries’
133. New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 19.
134. ECON. ANALYTICAL UNIT, AUSTL. GOV’T, SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE:
WINNING FROM LIBERALISATION, at ix, 3 (2004), available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/south_south/south_south_trade.pdf
[hereinafter WINNING FROM LIBERALISATION].
135. Ron Sandrey et al., Non-tariff Measures Inhibiting South African
Exports to China and India, in SOUTH AFRICA’S WAY AHEAD: LOOKING EAST
209,
237–38
(2008),
available
at
http://www.tralac.org/cause_data/images/1694/ChinaIndiaBook2008_20090218
.pdf.
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markets, especially tariff peaks and escalation in agriculture
and manufacturing, are particularly damaging to Africa and
undermine the continent’s plan to boost agricultural export and
improve value-added manufacturing. Obstacles to developing
countries’ markets in the form of tariffs and non-tariff barriers,
such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical
barriers to trade, are major problems that must be addressed if
Africa is to benefit from new Africa-South cooperation
frameworks. Countries in Africa are currently not part of the
more robust regional trade arrangements. The IBSA forum
involves only one country in Africa and its long-term
development impact is yet to be seen.136 Whether the GSTP will
achieve its full potential and become a viable instrument for
increasing market access opportunities in developing countries
also remains to be seen.137
2. More Trade But Few Countries Benefitting
Lack of diversity in terms of the countries in Africa that
are actively participating in Africa-South trade is a cause for
concern. Many countries are spectators in the unfolding AfricaSouth cooperation framework. In 2008, for example, Egypt
alone accounted for 51% of Africa’s export to Saudi Arabia,
Angola alone accounted for 48% of Africa’s export to China,
while South Africa alone accounted for 42% of the continent’s
export to the Republic of Korea. Also in 2008, “the five largest
African exporters to developing countries accounted for 67.5%
[sic] of the region’s total exports while the top 10 accounted for
89.2% [sic] [of the continent’s export].”138 Thus, in 2008:
 Five countries (Angola, Sudan, South Africa, Congo,
and Equatorial Guinea) accounted for 84% of the
continent’s export to China.
 Five countries (Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Angola,
and Morocco) accounted for 84% of the continent’s
export to India.
 Five countries (Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Morocco, and
136. See generally LAKSHMI PURI, IBSA: AN EMERGING TRINITY IN THE
NEW GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (UNCTAD, Policy Issues in Int’l
Trade & Commodities, Study Series No. 35, 2007) (discussing IBSA and its
impact on trade).
137. New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 20 (noting
that “[w]ays need to be found to reinvigorate the GSTP.”).
138. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at
33.
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South Africa) accounted for 93% of the continent’s
export to Brazil.
 Five countries (Egypt, South Africa, Morocco, Ethiopia,
and Sudan) accounted for 85% of the continent’s trade
export to Saudi Arabia.
In short, only a few countries in Africa are actively
participating in Africa-South trade as exporters. Many
countries in Africa are not enjoying a robust trade relationship
with those developing country trade partners that are
considered important export destinations for Africa. Unless this
trend is corrected, many countries in the continent risk being
marginalized within the South-South economic framework. The
countries at most risk are resource-poor LDCs in the continent.
3. Increased Investment Cooperation Benefitting Few
Countries
African LDCs are also on the margins of the emerging
investment geography. Africa-South FDI is concentrated by
destination. Only a few countries attract the significant share
of FDI inflow into Africa: Nigeria, Angola, Mauritius, Zambia,
South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya. According to
UNCTAD:
 Although between 1991 and 2008 Africa saw an increase
in mergers and acquisitions concluded by developing
country TNCs, two countries (Egypt and South Africa)
were most involved in Africa-South cross border M&A
and accounted for 58% of M&A concluded by developing
country TNCs.
 Five countries (Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Tunisia,
and Sudan) together accounted for 81% of cross-border
M&A concluded by TNCs from developing countries
from 1991 to 2008.
 In 2005, approximately three quarters of Malaysia’s FDI
went to just three countries – South Africa, Mauritius,
and Sudan.139
 FDI from Arab countries go principally to North African
countries.
In the area of infrastructure development, many countries
in Africa are also losing out. An estimated 70% of Chinese
infrastructure finance is going to only four countries: Nigeria,

139. Id. at 86.
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Because
Chinese
Angola,
Ethiopia,
and
Sudan.140
infrastructure loans are frequently tied to natural resource
development, countries that are naturally endowed are better
positioned to attract the loans. Angola is the biggest recipient
of Chinese infrastructure loans because of the presence of oil in
the country; about half of Chinese oil import from Africa comes
from Angola.
4. Structural Development/Commodity Dependence
The composition of Africa’s export to other developing
countries is also a concern. Manufactured value-added products
do not feature strongly in the composition of Africa’s export to
developing countries. Rather, Africa’s export to developing
countries is dominated by primary products (particularly fuel)
and the trend appears to be worsening (Figures 3, 4, and 5).141
In 1995, primary products accounted for a significant 55% of
African export to other developing countries outside Africa. By
2008, 75% of the continent’s export was composed of primary
products.142 In 1995, 27% of Africa’s export consisted of
resource-based manufactures, but the number fell to 15% in
2008. A similar decline is recorded for the continent’s export in
low, medium, and high technology manufactures which fell
from 18% in 1995 to 10% in 2008.143 The same gloomy trend
persists when the compositing of trade with the continent’s
main developing country trade partners (e.g., China and India)
is analyzed. Low, medium, and high technology manufactures
account for a meager 3.1% and 3.9% of the continent’s export to
China and India respectively. Simply put, “those developing
countries to which Africa exports the most are those for whom
low, medium and high technology manufactures represent the
lowest shares.”144 These figures are troubling and dim any hope
that South-South trade could be the key to Africa’s structural
development. According to UNCTAD:
140. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 120, at xiv.
141. Fuel (particularly oil) accounted for 67% of the continent’s export in
2008, with oil accounting for 89% of the continent’s fuel export to non-African
developing countries.
142. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at
36.
143. In terms of sheer value, Africa has recorded an increase in the value of
its low, medium and high technology manufacturing exports to other
developing countries from $2.3 billion in 1995 to $12 billion in 2008.
144. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at
38.
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As a result of the changing composition of Africa’s exports to nonAfrican developing countries in the past decade however, there is now
very little difference between the composition of Africa’s exports to
developing and developed countries. . . . In both cases, primary
products account for nearly three quarters of total exports while
resource-based manufactures account for 12–15 per cent. Low,
medium and high technology (other) manufactures make up a small
part of exports to both groups, accounting for about 10 per cent of
exports to developing countries and 14 per cent of exports to
developed countries.145

Commodity features strongly in Africa’s export to China. In
2009, five products–mineral products, base metal, precious
stones and metals, wood products, and textile and clothing–
accounted for 91% of total African export to China.
Furthermore, Africa exported mainly primary products with
little or no value-added to China while China’s main export to
Africa consisted of value-added manufacturing products
including, machinery (6%), transport equipment (5%), textiles
and clothing (3%), footwear (2%), and plastic products (2%).
The problem is also evident in the foreign investment arena. An
examination of the distribution of cross-border M&A in Africa
concluded by TNCs from developing countries shows an
overwhelming concentration in finance and natural resources:
finance (33%), mining, quarrying, and petroleum (25%),
transport, storage, and communications (25%), chemical and
chemical products (6%), trade (4%), electricity, water, and gas
(4%), and other secondary (8%).

145. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at
37–38.
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Source: Economic Development in Africa Report 2010, p. 37.

Figure 4

Source: Economic Development in Africa Report 2010, p. 38.
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Figure 5

Source: Economic Development in Africa Report 2010, p. 39.

The dominance of primary products in the continent’s
export raises concerns about commodity dependence and
attendant price volatility, suggests that efforts at addressing
supply-side constraints to Africa’s export have not been
effective, and points to the need for Southern partners to
address barriers to African exports in their countries. The
dominance of manufactures (particularly of consumer goods) in
Africa’s import raises concerns about the interests of domestic
industries given the influx of cheap products from other
developing countries.
5. Questioning Technology Development/Technology Transfer
South-South economic cooperation provides opportunity for
Africa to acquire needed technology from other developing
countries on better terms than has been the case in the context
of North-South Trade. However, it is difficult to determine if
effective and appropriate technology transfer is occurring and
on what terms. In the context of Africa-China trade and
investment, research reveals that technology transfer is not
occurring as much as is claimed in official documents of
FOCAC. Few Chinese firms operating in Africa have the
capability to innovate and themselves face frequent charges of
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intellectual property theft from companies in the West.146 The
focus of Chinese firms investing in Africa is not in the sectors
where rapid technology transfer is common.147 The distribution
of cross-border M&A in Africa by developing countries shows
concentration in Mining, Quarrying, and Petroleum (27%),
Finance (28%), Transport, Storage, and Communication (22%),
Chemicals and Chemical Products (6%), Electricity, Gas, and
Water (4%), and Trade (4%).
6. Sustainability of Domestic Industry
With 56% of Africa’s import coming from other developing
countries in 2008 and consisting primarily of low, medium, and
high manufactures, concerns about infant industries in the
continent necessarily arise.148 Even more worrying is the fact
that this trend is worsening. In 2000, manufactures made up
only 47% of Africa’s import from other developing countries
compared to 58% in 2008. In the context of China-Africa trade,
the influx of cheap textiles is threatening domestic industries
in Africa and undermining the continent’s export potential. The
influx of cheap Chinese textiles has reportedly resulted in the
shutdown of prominent Ghanaian textile firms like Ghana
Textile Print (GTP) and Printex. In Nigeria, the number of
Textile Manufacturing Association employees reportedly
dropped from 250,000 in 1996, to less than 30,000 in 2004 due
to influx of cheaper Chinese textiles. Popular textile companies
like Kaduna Textile Mill have shut down as a result.
7. Africa, Emerging Economies, and Global Governance
Architecture
It is increasingly accepted that large emerging countries
like China and India will reshape the current quasi-unilateral
world. However, it is not clear that the new multipolar world
will be less hostile to poor countries and countries on the
margin. It is also not clear that emerging economies will be
willing to fundamentally transform the global economic system
in ways that will benefit Africa. As countries like the US seek
to integrate emerging powers into international institutions,
146. Wong & Chan, supra note 102, at 296.
147. Id. at 285. See also Mark Wang, The Motivations Behind China’s
Government-Initiated Industrial Investments Overseas, 75 PACIFIC AFFAIRS
187 (2002).
148. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at
39.
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will these countries be willing and able to challenge and
transform the inherited geopolitical and economic landscape of
the post-World War II liberal order?
In the BIT sphere, there is at present no evidence that
emerging economies are seeking or attempting to transform the
post-World War II international regime for the governance of
foreign investment. What is emerging is not a new system of
global investment rules and norms that balance the interests of
investors against those of host nations. As the new exporters of
capital, countries such as China and India are concluding BITs
with other developing countries on the same terms and
conditions as those concluded by Western countries. This
author’s textual examination of China-Africa BITs yielded very
little difference between China-Africa BITs and BITs between
Africa and other Western countries (see Annex 1). Berger
concludes that in its BITs, “China has agreed to international
standards of the legal protection of FDI and thus to the current
liberal global governance regime for FDI.”149 According to
Berger, the Chinese government has adopted “a complimentary
rather than a competitive approach in the field of global FDI
governance” and “is not overthrowing the existing order of FDI
governance but has rather become part of it.”150
In sum, faced with Western powers intent on socializing
them into existing international institutions and safeguarding
the Western liberal order, rivalries and competition among
themselves, and their own domestic problems, emerging powers
may not have the willingness or the capacity to champion the
causes of poorer nations, may become selective in their SouthSouth cooperation agenda, and may seek to first advance their
respective national interests. The April 2010 Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)151 between the United States and the
Government of Brazil establishing a fund for technical
assistance and capacity building related to the cotton sector in
Brazil is a case in point. Accepting compensation from the US
as a solution to the “cotton dispute” may be in Brazil’s national
149. AXEL BERGER, CHINA AND THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE EMERGING LIBERAL BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATY APPROACH 22 (German Development Institute ed., 2008).
150. Id. at 26.
151. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S., Brazil
Agree on Memorandum of Understanding As Part of Path Forward Towards
Resolution of Cotton Dispute (Apr. 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pressoffice/press-releases/2010/april/us-brazil-agree-memorandum-understandingpart-path-f.
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interest but is not in the interest of African farmers whose
livelihood are damaged by US subsidies.
8. Obstacles and Barriers to South-South Trade
Obstacles to developing countries’ markets in the form of
tariffs and non-tariff barriers such as sanitary and
phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade are a
major problem that must be addressed if Africa is to benefit
from Africa-South cooperation. One report found that:
 Average applied tariff of developing countries are above
developed country rates, despite liberalization attempts
in the past decade;
 Approximately 70% of tariffs that developing country
exporters face are applied by other developing
countries;
 Developing country service trade barriers are also
significantly higher than those of developed countries;
 Compared to developed countries, developing countries
have more incidence of tariff peaks, with over onequarter of developing countries having more that 40%
of tariffs at 15 % or higher;
 Developing countries’ tariffs in manufacture and
agriculture are particularly harmful to developing
countries’ economies and much welfare gains will be
realized through their elimination.152
Barriers in developing countries’ markets, particularly
tariff peaks and escalation in agriculture and manufacturing,
are particularly damaging to Africa and undermine the
continent’s plans to boost agricultural export and improve
manufacturing value-added. Clearly, asymmetries in the
economic relations between Africa and key Southern partners
are a major concern. Non-traditional barriers to trade impede
Africa’s export and erode any benefit the continent might have
gained from available preferential access schemes.
9. Weak Institutional Framework
At present Africa-South arrangements lack strong
institutional frameworks. Much is promised and little delivered
in part because of the absence of an effective monitoring
mechanism. Urgently needed are necessary institutional
frameworks that can: (i) facilitate broad-based strategic
152. WINNING FROM LIBERALISATION, supra note 134, at ix.

EWELUKWA - Final Version

560

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

4/22/2011 6:17 PM

[Vol 20:2

dialogues involving governments and the private sector; (ii)
monitor the implementation of commitments; (iii) identify and
raise awareness about trade and investment opportunities in
Africa and developing partner countries; and (iv) identify
problems when they arise. At present, only a few bilateral
arrangements involving Africa have formal dialogue platforms:
China-Africa (2000), India-Africa (2008), Korea-Africa (2006),
and Turkey-Africa (2008). Most other bilateral arrangements
lack any formal dialogue platform raising questions about their
long term survivability (See Table 1, pp. 35).153 In the context of
China-Africa relations, FOCAC provides the necessary
institutional framework. Monitoring of commitment is carried
out through multi-level FOCAC meetings. However, while
FOCAC has its office in China, it has no presence in Africa.
Moreover, there are no annual or progress reports from
FOCAC, no mechanism for filing complaints or resolving
conflicts, and no meaningful process for stakeholder
engagement. In recent years, China has made efforts to involve
the private sector in FOCAC processes.
Africa-South America Cooperative Forum of State and
Government (ASACOF) was established in 2006 pursuant to
the Abuja Resolution on Africa-South America Cooperative
Forum. As envisaged, ASACOF shall meet every two years,
alternating between the two regions. In the 2006 resolution,
the two sides also resolved to “[c]ontinously monitor the
effective implementation of the Plan of Action for maximum
benefit” and “[s]et up appropriate institutions and mechanisms
to give practical expression to the Cooperative Forum.”154 The
First Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) of the ASA was held at
the Itamaraty Palace, Ministry of External Relations, Brasilia,
Brazil, on June 10–11 2008. One of the objectives of the
meeting was to refine the structure and follow-up mechanisms
of ASA/ASACOF. In the same vein, the institutional framework
of the India-Africa Forum is still being worked out. In
Paragraph 20 of the Delhi Declaration adopted in 2008
following the India-Africa Forum Summit, the two sides agreed
that in addition to high level political exchanges between them
in the bilateral, regional, and multilateral contexts, Africa and
153. For example, arrangements between Africa and the following
countries have no formal platform for dialogue: Brazil, Cuba, U.A.E.,
Venezuela, Malaysia, Kuwait, Singapore, Thailand, and Bolivia.
154. Abuja Resolution on Africa-South America Cooperative Forum, supra
note 79, paras. 8–9.
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India must meet every three years.155 The next summit is
planned for 2011 in Africa.156
The long-term prospects and credibility of Africa-South
engagements may depend on the establishment of credible
institutions and the ability of the institutions, once created, to
command the respect of respective governments and
stakeholders.
10. Dispute Settlement
Related to institutional building is the absence of
established mechanisms for the settlement of disputes that
may arise now or in the future. It is not clear how grievances
and disputes are or will be resolved under the new
arrangements. Will South-South partners favor a power-based
system of dispute settlement over a rule-based system? In the
context of China-Africa arrangements, friendly consultation is
presently favored. Exactly what “friendly consultation” means
or encompasses is not clear. In the Declaration of the Beijing
Summit 2006, for example, both sides agreed to “[p]roperly
handle issues and challenges that may arise in the course of
cooperation through friendly consultation in keeping with
China-Africa friendship and the long-term interests of the two
sides.”157 Also in the Beijing Platform for Action, the two sides
agreed to “[p]roperly address, in a spirit of mutual
understanding and accommodation, trade disputes and
frictions
through
bilateral
or
multilateral
friendly
consultations.”158 Finally, in the Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan,
the two sides agreed “to properly handle trade differences and
frictions through friendly consultation under the principle of
mutual understanding and mutual accommodation.”159
Disputes will necessarily arise and designing appropriate and
effective dispute settlement procedures is an issue that must be
addressed in the context of South-South economic cooperation.
In this regard, developing countries will one day have to
address some of the thorny issues that presently plague the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
155. Delhi Declaration, supra note 113.
156. Id. para. 20.
157. Declaration of the Beijing Summit, supra note 86.
158. Beijing Action Plan, supra note 88, para. 3.3.
159. Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan, supra note 127, para. 4.4.7. “The two
sides agreed to encourage the usage of national and regional arbitration
organs in resolving contractual conflicts between Chinese and African
enterprises.” Id. at para. 4.4.8.
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11. The Cost of Overlapping South-South Negotiations and
Partnerships
For poor countries in Africa, the emergence of new
initiatives and structures for cooperation comes at a significant
cost. African LDCs must worry about the financial and human
cost of participating in multiple fora including the WTO,
regional and sub-regional institutions, as well as growing
bilateral processes. The bilateral processes may prove much
more burdensome because each partner has its own framework
for cooperation. Concurrent participation in the Doha Round
negotiations and the GSTP negotiations may be too expensive
and overwhelming for many countries in Africa (see Table 1).
Table 1
Bilateral
Cooperation
Forum on
China-Africa
Cooperation

Organizational
Structure
Follow-up Committee
of FOCAC/Ministerial
conferences

India-Africa
Forum Summit

No
organizational
structure/ Heads of
State Summit
KOAFEC Secretariat/
KOAFEC Consultative
Group/
KOAFEC
Ministerial
Conference
No
organizational
structure/ Heads of
State Summit

Korea-Africa
Economic
Cooperation
Turkey-Africa
Co-operation
Summit

Frequency of
Meetings
Every
three
years:
2000,
2003, 2006, and
2009
Every
three
years: 2008
Every two years:
2006, 2008, and
2010
Every five years:
2008

UNCTAD has suggested that Southern partners “consider
streamlining and aligning their initiatives to reduce the
transactions costs to Africa and maximize their benefits.”
However, it is doubtful that the suggestion to streamline
initiatives will be considered in the foreseeable future.160

160. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at
27.
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C. THE UGLY: THE DANGEROUS ASPECTS OF SOUTH-SOUTH
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
1. Resource for Infrastructure Deals: Another Debt Trap?
In 2006, China pledged US$3 billion in preferential loans
and US$2 billion of preferential buyer’s credits to Africa. In
2009, following the 4th FOCAC Ministerial Conference, Beijing
pledged to provide US$10 billion in concessional loans to
African countries and to support Chinese financial institutions
by setting up a US$1 billion special loan for small and mediumsized African businesses. China-Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank
provides the bulk (about 92%) of the resources for Chinese
infrastructure development in Africa.161 “Resources for
infrastructure” or “Angola mode” is China Ex-Im Bank’s
preferred mode for doing business with countries in Africa with
abundant resources and limited creditworthiness. Under this
deal structure, African governments use natural resources to
repay loans received for infrastructure development. The
Angola mode allows the Chinese government to “gain physical
security over oil resources” and allows beneficiary governments
to obtain needed finance. To date, about eight deals totaling
more than US$3 billion have been reported, including a 2007
deal with Ghana worth US$562 million involving cocoa, a 2005
deal with Nigeria worth US$298 million involving oil, and a
US$1 billion deal with Guinea and involving Bauxite. Although
natural resource-based transactions in the oil industry are not
unique or novel, they raise new concerns today for several
reasons including the lack of transparency surrounding the
loan negotiations,162 the lack of conditionality attached to the
loans, and the danger of unsustainable loans.
Is Beijing’s offer of cheap loans to African governments
reversing gains in the effort to address unsustainable debts in
the continent? “If countries are borrowing to the extent that
their debt becomes unsustainable then that undermines all the
work that has been done in trying to tackle unsustainable
debt,” Hilary Benn, then Britain’s International Development
161. Additional funds comes from Chinese government (3%), State owned
enterprises (5%) and the China-Africa Development Fund (0.3%). See
BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 120, at 53.
162. Id. at 55 (noting that “[r]elatively little is known about the terms of
the China Ex-Im Bank’s concessional loans.”). Being a state policy bank,
details of the activities of China’s Ex-Im Bank are not available and cannot be
scrutinized by stakeholders in Africa.
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Secretary, told reporters.163 Guinea, for example, has
contracted Chinese debts in excess of the value of debt relief by
the OECD, receiving about US$870 million in debt relief and
accepting concessional loans from China to the tune of US$1
billion.164 Also, Nigeria has received about US$10.022 billion in
debt relief and has accepted Chinese infrastructure finance to
the tune of US$5.398 billion. However, Foster, Butterfield,
Chen, and Pushak conclude that “some of the largest
beneficiaries of Chinese finance . . . have not been beneficiaries
of recent debt relief initiatives,” and that “[t]here are only a
handful of countries where the value of recent loans contracted
to China represents a high share of the value of recent OECD
debt relief.”165
2. Human Rights/Labor Rights Concerns.
Human rights as a concept do not feature strongly in
South-South discourse and framework documents. Beijing’s
emphasis on respect for the sovereignty of African countries is
commendable but can be and is being used as a pretext for
ignoring serious human rights abuses in the continent and
dealing with Africa’s most brutal and corrupt leaders. Whether
China is safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of
African peoples or just the interest of corrupt leaders in the
continent is a question that increasingly must be asked.
Admittedly China is gradually moving away from its noninterference stance.166 In his speech at the 4th Ministerial
Conference, the Chinese Premier expressed China’s willingness
to “increase involvement in the settlement of issues concerning
peace and security in Africa” but also reaffirmed China’s noninterference stance:

163. JOHN HUMPHREY, RESEARCH IN EUROPE AND AFRICA-CHINA
RELATIONSHIPS: A REPORT FOR THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION 2 (2007),
available at http://asiandrivers.open.ac.uk/documents/china_africa_research.p
df.
164. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 120, at 64.
165. Id. at 65.
166. The Chinese government has appointed a special representative for
African affairs. Since 2006, China has sent a total of 6,281 peacekeeping
personnel and policemen to Africa, including 1,629 who are serving in six UN
peacekeeping missions. China has also dispatched four naval fleets to the
waters off the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden for escorting missions.
Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Beijing Summit of the Forum
on
China-Africa
Cooperation,
FOCAC
(Nov.
10,
2009),
http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/hywj/t627504.htm.
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The Chinese government and people respect the right of African
countries to independently choose their social systems and support
the African people in exploring development paths that suit their
national conditions. We firmly believe that Africa is fully capable of
solving its own problems in an African way. The economic cooperation
and trade between China and Africa are based on mutual benefit,
win-win progress, openness and transparency. China has never
attached any political strings to its support and assistance to Africa,
and nor will it do so in the future.167

Ignoring the human rights record of African leaders
arguably contradicts the development objectives of South-South
partnership and makes it harder for regulatory institutions and
civil society organizations in Africa to question the human
rights record of the increasing number of emerging
multinational corporations operating in the continent. In the
future, alliances between civil society organizations based in
the South will be needed to complement growing South-South
trade and investment. Although international human rights
and development organizations such as Human Rights Watch
and Oxfam will remain relevant in Africa for the foreseeable
future, partnerships between African-based human rights
organizations and similar organizations based in countries such
as India, China, Brazil, and South Korea will be needed to
ensure that human rights is more fully integrated into SouthSouth cooperation discourse and that the activities of emerging
multinationals and other private actors are constantly on the
radar.
3. Environmental Concerns
Africa-South economic cooperation is orchestrating new
activities in the extractive industry, spurring never before seen
infrastructure
development,
and
may
also
spur
industrialization in the continent in the near future. China has
become a major player in the development of hydropower in
Africa and its investments are generally concentrated in
environmentally sensitive sectors. These developments raise
serious questions about the environmental consequences of
Africa-South cooperation. Environmental concerns in the
context of Africa-South cooperation are heightened by the fact
that many of the activities in the extractive industry and the
construction sector involve hitherto unknown corporations –
companies that are typically not on the radar of international
environmental groups and have yet to develop credible
167. Jiabao, supra note 81.
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environmental policies. In the case of China, activities carried
out by state-owned enterprises raise additional questions about
transparency, liability, and sovereign immunity in the event of
lawsuits. Troubling projects of the past decade include:
 the Belinga mine project in Gabon, a US$3.5 billion dam
construction project involving a Chinese company
which threatened the destruction of the Kongou Fall in
the Invindo National Park;
 the Merowe Dam in Sudan, a US$519 million project
approved by the China Ex-IM Bank and credited for
displacing more than 50,000 Sudanese from the Nile
Valley into desert locations;
 the Gibe 3 Dam in Ethiopia, a US$1.75 billion project by
Italian hydropower developer Salini Costruttori backed
by Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)
and mainland power equipment supplier Dongfang
Electric Corporation. The dam threatens the livelihood
of 500,000 indigenous, according to environmental
groups; and
 the Bui Dam project in Ghana involving Sinohydro and
financed by China Ex-Im Bank (the dam threatens the
Bui National Park in Ghana).
What are the duties and responsibilities of construction
companies, energy companies, and infrastructure financiers
from other developing countries operating in Africa? In the
event of massive human rights and environmental damage
what might be the legal liability of these actors?
In the future, it will be important to monitor the
environmental policies of Southern partners and Southern
corporations operating in Africa. In the last decade China
created a Ministry of Environmental Protection, strengthened
environmental regulations, and adopted a green credit policy.
China is also a leading promoter of renewable energy
possibilities. Whether these changes translate into good
environmental practices abroad, particularly in Africa, is hard
to tell. It will be up to African civil society groups in
partnership with civil society groups in other developing
countries and international NGOs to pressure new actors in
Africa to adopt credible and effective environmental policies. In
2004, under pressure from international environmental groups,
China Ex-Im Bank adopted an environmental policy, and in
2008, adopted more detailed guidelines. In 2008, the Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) adopted the
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international environmental principle known as the Equator
Principles. China Ex-Im Bank has reportedly signed a
memorandum of understanding with the World Bank to share
information on project evaluation procedures.168 On January 4,
2008, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission of the State Council (SASAC) publicly issued CSR
Guideline for State-Owned Enterprises.169 Again, whether
these reforms meet with international standards is a question
that must be asked, and whether they will be implemented
remains to be seen.
4. African LDCs and South-South Arrangements
Although declarations and resolutions of the G-77
acknowledge the situation of LDCs and call for sensitivity
towards the LDCs, there is yet to emerge a concrete program or
consensus on how to address the structural, economic, and
social constraints these countries face, which make it difficult
for them to take advantage of opportunities in South-South
trade. The Caracas Programme of Action called for “special
attention should be paid to countries in greater need,
particularly the Least Developed Countries, so that they can
effectively participate and benefit from programmes of
economic cooperation among developing countries in all fields
of such cooperation.”170 According to the GSTP Declaration,
“[t]he special needs of the least developed countries should be
clearly recognized and concrete preferential measures in favour
of these countries should be agreed upon; the least developed
countries will not be required to make concessions on a
reciprocal basis.”171 In the São Paulo Declaration, G-77
members pledged to “work towards developing concrete
preferential measures to be accorded in favour of leastdeveloped country participants.”172 Despite the declarations
168. Ethiopia Dam Blot on China’s Aid Record, E. AFR. FORUM: NEWS
HORN OF AFR. (June 8, 2010), http://www.eastafricaforum.net/2010/
06/08/ethiopia-dam-blot-on-chinas-aid-record/.
169. See generally Peter Bosshard, China’s Environmental Footprint in
Africa, SAAIA CHINA IN AFR. POLICY BRIEFING, at 6 (Apr. 2008),
http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/SAIIA%20policy%20briefing%20508.p
df.
170. Caracas Programme of Action 1981, supra note 45,
171. Global System of Trade Preferences Among Developing Countries
[GSTP], Agreement on the Global System of Trade Preferences Among
Developing
Countries,
at
4
(Apr.
12,
1988),
http://www.unctadxi.org/Secured/GSTP/LegalInstruments/gstp_en.pdf.
172. GSTP, São Paulo Declaration on the Launching of the Third Round of
FROM THE
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and affirmations, many questions are yet to be resolved in the
context of South-South economic cooperation. Will special and
differential treatment (SDT) and aid for trade (AfT) feature in
South-South trade and to what degree? What kind of market
access concessions will Southern partners offer LDCs? Will
preference schemes become a strong component of South-South
trade discourse?
5. Secrecy/Lack of Transparency
There is still a lot that ordinary citizens do not know about
Africa-South trade. Contracts involving millions of dollars and
vast amounts of natural resources are concluded without public
debate or discussion. Contracts are awarded through secret
bidding processing that many believe to be rigged. The result is
that many in Africa do not understand the scope and potential
implication of growing Africa-South trade and do not embrace
the unfolding arrangements. China’s trade and investment
agenda in Africa is still not fully known or understood by
ordinary Africans.173 In part because of China’s state-centric
approach to African diplomacy, much secrecy surrounds
China’s day to day activities in the region from negotiations for
important contracts to their eventual execution. Secrecy is
especially damaging in the South-South context because
presently most of the activities implicate natural resources
where human rights and environmental pollution are rife and
where long-term development goals could be compromised with
a stroke of the pen. Negotiations regarding Gabon’s Belinga
mine project, a US$3.5 billion project that was designed to
include a mine, a dam, railroads, and a port facility, were
carried out in complete secrecy. Although the dam potentially
affected whole communities and threatened the lives of
thousands, those who would be affected were largely unaware
of the negotiations and were neither consulted nor informed
about the project. Gabonese activists that raised concerns about
the proposed project were harassed and jailed. Moreover, under
Negotiations Within the Global System of Trade Preferences Among Developing
Countries, ¶ 4, GSTP/C.P./SSB/5 (July 23, 2004), http://www.unctadxi.org/Secu
red/GSTP/Declarations/spd_en.pdf.
173. See generally Frequently Asked Questions about Corruption,
INT’L:
GLOBAL
COALITION AGAINST
CORRUPTION,
TRANSPARENCY
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq (last visited Feb.
18, 2011) (defining “transparency” as “a principle that allows those affected by
administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable work to know not
only the basic facts and figures but also the mechanisms and processes.”).
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the terms of a leaked copy of the Belinga mine project
agreement, Gabon was to receive only 10% of the mining profit
while the Chinese company involved in the project was granted
a 25-year tax break. Not only are the African populace and civil
society groups not informed of on-going negotiations,
information regarding Chinese operations in Africa is also
generally very difficult to access—an issue clearly complicated
by the involvement of state owned enterprises.
6. Asymmetries of the New Geography of Trade and Investment
Asymmetries in Africa-South trade raise serious concerns
as well and suggest that, for many countries, South-South
trade may not be any different from Africa-North trade. In this
regard, both the content and terms of Africa-South trade are a
concern. Although Africa’s trade with developing countries has
increased and the continent’s trade with developed countries is
decreasing, the continent “has a trade surplus with developing
countries but a surplus with developed countries.”174 Simply
put, Africa is importing more from other developing countries
than the continent is exporting to them. Thus, while countries
such as Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon, and Turkey are
increasingly depending on Africa as a market for their export,
Africa is not depending on these countries as a market for its
export to the same extent. In 2008, 12% of Syria’s export went
to Africa while only 6.8% of its import came from Africa. The
same is true for Lebanon and Turkey; 15.36% of Lebanon’s
export went to Africa and only 4.34% of the country’s import
came from Africa. In 2008, 6.87% of Turkey’s export went to
Africa, while only 3.85% of Africa’s export goes to Turkey.
Africa’s trade deficit with other developing countries is
therefore a major concern. Also worrying is the fact that
Southern partners are primarily interested in Africa’s natural
resources. In 2008, 84% of Africa’s export to China was
comprised of primary products while only 16% was comprised
of manufactures; of the manufactures, only 3.1% are low,
medium, and high technology manufactures. On the other
hand, during the same period, the share of low, medium and
high technology manufactures in Africa’s import from China
stood at 86% (up from 76% in 2000).175
Thus, although China typically views evolving relations
174. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at
30.
175. Id. at 39.
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with Africa through a North-South, post-colonial prism, African
nations should not be seduced into believing that the ChinaAfrica arrangement will be automatically beneficial and
produce win-win outcomes for all. In a speech at the 4th
Ministerial Conference in 2009, the Chinese Premier stated:
Our relationship is based on mutual support . . . It is guided by the
core principle of mutual respect and equality. It is driven by our joint
endeavor to pursue mutually-beneficial cooperation and common
development . . . We are all developing countries and face both rare
historic opportunities for faster development and complex global
challenges.
We
should
enhance
mutually
beneficial
cooperation . . . Cooperation between us will catalyze South-South
cooperation and enhance the collective standing of developing
countries in the international political and economic architecture.
Cooperation between us will promote democracy in international
relations and justice in the international order . . . .176

7. The Absence of Ground Rules on Some Fundamental Issues:
New Rules for a New Trade and Investment Geography
The new geography of trade and investment forces a
rethinking on the role of law in economic relations and the legal
gaps in existing South-South arrangements. For example, what
is the role and responsibility of EMNCs operating in Africa? Is
there room for special and differential treatment in SouthSouth arrangement? What will be the mechanism for dispute
settlement in the South-South context? Will trade-related
technical
assistance
feature
in
South-South
trade
arrangements?177 Overall, will developing countries simply
adapt existing norms and practices or will they create new ones
better suited to their economic situations and development
aspirations?
On the investment front, developing countries appear to
have simply embraced existing norms and modalities relating
to the governance and protection of foreign investments. There
are few discernible differences between the content of South176. Jiabao, supra note 81.
177. See ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73,
at 42. UNCTAD suggests that Southern partners “could . . . play a direct role
in boosting Africa’s capacity to export manufactures by contributing to the Aid
for Trade Initiative as well as by making technology transfer an important
component of their technology assistance to the region.” Id. UNCTAD suggests
that Southern partners “could . . . play a direct role in boosting Africa’s
capacity to export manufactures by contributing to the Aid for Trade Initiative
as well as by making technology transfer an important component of their
technology assistance to the region.” Id.
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South BITs and those of North-South BITs. For example,
features of China-Africa BITs include: broad asset-based
definition of investment, absolute standards of treatment (e.g.,
fair and equitable treatment), relative standards of treatment
(e.g., national treatment and most-favored nations), protection
against expropriation, protection against wars, riots, and
related civil disturbances, transfer of funds provision, and most
importantly, extensive investor-State dispute settlement
provision.
8. Labor Rights Concerns
Labor rights issues arise on two fronts. First, will SouthSouth economic cooperation boost employment opportunities in
Africa, and to what degree? Second, what are the labor rights
implications of the activities of corporations from other
developing countries in sectors such as the extractive industry
or the construction industry? Regarding the later, new foreign
employers are appearing on the scene in Africa. Unfortunately,
many countries in the continent lack the capacity to effectively
assess the employment and labor law implications of AfricaSouth arrangements. Anecdotal evidence suggests that labor
rights violations are occurring. A baseline study by the
International Labor Organization (ILO) of labor practices on
construction sites in the United Republic of Tanzania, involving
eleven large construction projects, found that three of the four
projects that were found to have exceptionally low labor
standards, with long working hours, low pay, low standard of
occupational safety and health (OSH), and a poor record on
workers’ rights, were operated by Chinese contractors.178 The
study, according to the authors, suggests that the success
Chinese contractors are having in winning an increasing
number of tenders in Tanzania “may . . . be at the expense of
the labour force.”179
Labor practices of Southern partners must be continually
probed. The issue is important and complicated in Africa
178. See International Labour Organization National Construction Council,
Baseline Study of Labour Practices on large construction sites in the United
Republic of Tanzania, at 84–85, Sectoral Activites Program, Working Paper
225 (2005) (noting the nationalities of the main contractors that were part of
the study as Chinese (4), Japanese (2), South African (1), Kuwaiti (1), Danish
(1) and Indian (1)). The study found that three projects—two with South
Africa contractors and one with Norwegian contractor—had consistently high
standards. Id.
179. See id.
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because sectors such as construction, mining, and oil and gas
that are found to be the most corruption-prone are also the
sectors that have attracted EMNCs the most. Transparency
International’s 2008 Bribe Payer’s Index (BPI) ranked the
BRIC countries and Mexico at the bottom on a list of 22 leading
international and regional exporting countries measured by the
tendency of their firms to bribe abroad.180 At the very bottom
was Russia with a score of 5.9, followed by China (6.5), Mexico
(6.6), India (6.8) and Brazil (7.4). Brazil has ratified the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, but Russia, India, and China have
not.
9. State-Centered Development Model/Lack of Broad
Stakeholder Involvement
South-South discussions and dialogue occur primarily at
the ministerial level and frequently ignore important
constituencies in the private sector and civil society. China’s
bilateral, state-centric approach to diplomacy in Africa
privileges the political elite in the continent at the same time
that it sidelines important non-state actors as well as subregional and regional organizations in Africa. At present,
unfolding bilateral arrangements are driven primarily by the
respective governments and not by the private sector. This
creates two problems. First, it appears to encourage, in Africa,
a development path that ignores private domestic
constituencies and interest groups. Second, it makes it difficult
to assess the extent to which Chinese involvement in the region
addresses the needs of ordinary Africans. Thus far, Beijing has
been creative in meeting “elite-defined needs” in the continent.
The private sector must be involved for South-South
economic cooperation to work. In response to criticism, Beijing
is now making more of an effort to involve the private sector in
FOCAC activities. The last decade witnessed the establishment
of the China-Africa Chamber of Industry and Commerce in
2006, the convening of the High-level Dialogue between
Chinese and African Leaders and Business Representatives in
2006, the establishment of a China-Africa Development Fund
(Cadfund) in 2007, and the first, second, and third Conference
of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs.181 At the 2006 meeting
180. Bribe Players Index 2008, TRANSPARENCY INT’L: THE GLOBAL
COALITION
AGAINST
CORRUPTION
(Dec.
8,
2008),
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/bpi_2008.
181. The first conference was held in 2003; the second conference was in
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of the Chinese and African business communities, Premier Wen
Jiabao pledged that the Chinese Government “will continue to
facilitate the exchanges and cooperation between the Chinese
and African business communities.”182 Following the 3rd
Conference in 2009, China pledged, in the next three years, to
support Chinese enterprises to set up three to five full-service
logistic centers in Africa. Jointly founded in 2004 by the China
Society for Promotion of the Guangcai Program, the United
Nations Development Programme, and the Ministry of
Commerce/China International Center for Economic &
Technical Exchanges, the China-Africa Business Council now
provides practical business tools to facilitate the strengthening
of business ties between China and Africa.183
In conclusion, judged by available information, AfricaSouth trade will not necessarily and automatically produce
benefits to Africa. Among nations and within nations in Africa,
there will be winners and losers. Presently, trade and
investment from China is concentrated in a few countries and
in a few sectors. On the winning side are resource-rich and
politically strategic countries in the region such as Nigeria,
Angola and even Sudan. On the losing side will be resourcepoor, marginal countries in the continent. Is UNCTAD correct
in its assertion that Southern partners “have a responsibility to
ensure that the relationship with Africa yields maximum
benefits to both sides?”184 Asserting such a responsibility is
easy; more difficult and complicated is devising how to
2006 in Beijing; the third conference was in November 2009 in Egypt. See
Chinese, African Entrepreneurs Gather in Egypt to Push Economic Co-op,
PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Nov. 8, 2009), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/9000
1/90776/90883/6806802.html. Following the second conference, 16 cooperative
agreements were reportedly signed between 12 Chinese enterprises and
African governments and firms, worth of nearly $1.9 billion in total. Id. About
500 Chinese and African entrepreneurs reportedly attended the third
conference. Id. At the conclusion of the conference, contracts of 16 cooperation
projects were signed, and letters of intention for cooperation in 15 projects
were also inked, to the tune of $500 million. Id.
182. Wen Jiabao, Premier St. Council China, Address at the Opening
Ceremony of the High-level Dialogue Between Chinese and African Leaders
and Business Representatives And the Second Conference of Chinese and
African Entrepreneurs: Strengthen China Africa Cooperation for Mutual
Benefit (Nov. 4, 2006), http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/SP32009/t60755
2.htm.
183. See Brief Introduction to China-Africa Business Council, CHINA-AFR.
BUS. COUNCIL, http://www.cabc.org.cn/english/introduce.asp.
184. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at
26–27.

EWELUKWA - Final Version

574

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

4/22/2011 6:17 PM

[Vol 20:2

encourage and or compel Southern partners, particularly the
advanced developing countries, to operate fairly and
responsibly given the new trade and investment geography.
The long-term dividend to Africa of Africa-South engagement is
yet to be assessed. Thus, while Chinese firms are getting into
Africa, it is not clear on what terms and to whose benefits they
operate. According to Wong and Chan, Chinese firms that
venture overseas “are typically small” and “are usually unable
to share capital, technology, market information, or production
resources.”185 They also note that “[o]nly one-third of oversea
investments are profitable, with only one-third barely servicing
and the rest in the red or even being wound up.”186 This is bad
news in a continent looking to FDI to spur its manufacturing
sector.
VI. AFRICA-SOUTH TRADE AND INVESTMENT
COOPERATION: THE NEXT STEPS
Even if the idea of a new trade geography is accepted,
countries in Africa will not automatically benefit under the new
geography and are presently not moving any closer to the
centre of international or regional economic relations.
Undoubtedly, there are immense opportunities in Africa-South
trade for countries in Africa to boost export, access
development finance, and gain better integration into the
multilateral economic system. However, Africa risks
marginalization in the South-South framework unless
asymmetries between Africa and key Southern partners are
immediately addressed. Factors that have furthered Africa’s
marginalization in the globalization process such as weak
policy framework and institutions, protection at home and
abroad, dependence on few primary products, deep-seated
structural problems, and imbalances must also be addressed as
a matter of urgency. Unless attention is paid to the foundations
of emerging Africa-South arrangements, the continent may find
itself further marginalized even in the new trade and
investment geography.187
185. Wong & Chang, supra note 102, at 278.
186. See id. at 278. See also Goh Sui Noi, China Firms Spread Wings but
Many Fail to Take Off, STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002.
187. See New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 1
(noting that the share of the South in global trade and financial flows has
grown dramatically but that “[n]ot all countries in South have been able to
take part in this journey.”).
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Whether the journey on the South-South train will be
smooth, rapid, and beneficial for peoples and countries in Africa
will depend on African countries themselves, other Southern
partners, and the international community. African countries
have the primary responsibility for promoting and
implementing South-South trade and investment cooperation.
It is, however, important that the international community
support the continent’s effort to expand South-South
cooperation. In Resolution 58/220, the UN General Assembly
recognized “the urgent need to help to strengthen the capacities
of the developing countries, especially the least developed
countries, to participate in and benefit from globalization and
liberalization processes.”188 In the Accra Accord of UNCTAD
XII, Heads of State and Government noted that “[t]he new
opportunities for trade, investment and economic cooperation
among developing countries need to be fully exploited, and this
tendency should be encouraged and benefits extended to all
regions.”189
A. AFRICA
African countries must urgently seek ways to strategically
integrate South-South trade, investment, and economic
cooperation into their respective development plans and must
proactively respond to the opportunities emerging in SouthSouth trade. Not only must the continent expand the direction
of its trade, but it must also expand the content of its export.
African leaders, with active participation from the private
sector, must find solutions to the continent’s minimal share of
global trade, weak technology base that prevent manufacturing
value-added in the continent, and unhealthy dependence on
commodities. As the President of Tanzania rightly noted:
Africa is not only the greatest loser in a globalising world~ it is also
structurally and institutionally positioned to continue being the
greatest loser unless African leaders and their citizens think again of
the realities of our world, and how to break away from the systemic
injustice and procedural unfairness that characterizes our
engagement with the outside world.190
188. G.A. Res. 58/220, supra note 12, ¶ 6.
189. Accra Accord, supra note 2, para. 52.
190. Benjamin Mkapa, President of Tanz., Speech by the President of the
United Republic of Tanzania to the African Union Commission (Aug. 31,
2005), available at http://www.africa-union.org/VISITS/Tanzania%20Pdt%203
1aug05/SPEECH%20BY%20THE%20PRESIDENT%20OF%20THE%20UNIT
ED%20REPUBLIC%20OF%20TANZANIA.htm.
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Unfortunately, while there is much talk in Africa about
improving the continent’s economic indicators, there is less
action in terms of creating the enabling environment needed for
sustainable development and growth. The Tanzanian President
notes that he “[has] not seen [Africa] seriously and sufficiently
strategizing on this matter. Very little time in our agenda is
devoted to such matters, which ultimately will determine
Africa’s place in the globalization process”191 Clearly, Africa has
to do a better job of effectively managing external relationships
in a way that furthers the continent’s long-term and strategic
interests such as the goals of diversification, value-addition,
human security, and sustainable development. Finally,
countries in Africa must individually and collectively determine
how to manage openness in a post-crisis global environment
given new questions now being raised about the wisdom and
merits of trade liberalization and openness to foreign
investment.
1. Coordinated, Strategic Policy Response Based on Targeted
Priorities
A coordinated and reasoned response to Africa-South
cooperation is necessary if Africa is to reap any benefit from
South-South engagement. Even more important is a China
strategy given China’s present dominance in the region. It is
not clear that individual countries in Africa or the different
regional economic communities in the continent have
articulated their China/South strategy. The African Union (AU)
is only now struggling to identify a role for the organization in
the new Africa-South arrangements. It is important that
countries in Africa identify their individual and collective
strengths including the areas where the continent enjoys
comparative advantage, identify the continent’s long-term
strategic interests, and engage Southern partners from a
position of unity. It must be accepted that international
relations, including South-South relations, are based on power
and interests despite the rhetoric of “win-win” and “mutually
beneficial” outcomes that dominate present South-South
dialogues.
A coordinated and united voice in Africa’s engagement with
Southern partners will go a long way in making up for the
continent’s
structural
weaknesses,
including
political
191. Id.
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fragmentation, poverty, donor-dependence, weak institutions,
and weak markets. In this respect, regional integration in
Africa is increasingly an important and indispensable tool that
Africa needs in order to effectively manage external relations
from a position of strength. Compared to other regions, Africa
has the lowest level of intra-regional trade and investment
standing at only 10% according to the World Bank. Regional
integration will address the problem of weak national and
regional markets, reduce the continent’s dependence on nonAfrican markets for economic growth, and generally improve
global competitiveness. Although African leaders identify
regional integration as imperative, they presently lack the
political will to take the steps needed to move the agenda
forward.
African leaders must also get Southern partners to include
and involve pan-African organizations and regional economic
communities such as the Economic Community of West African
States in future dialogues. Such a coordinated and unified
response will make for more focused and organized engagement
with potential partners and will ensure that some countries are
not marginalized in emerging arrangements and that broad
continental goals and visions are not easily forgotten. In the
China-Africa context, some changes are underway. China is
currently sponsoring the construction of the AU conference
center scheduled to be completed in 2012. Since 2008, China
and the AU have held an annual dialogue; from October 31 to
November 3, 2010, the Chairperson of the Africa Union
Commission (AUC), Dr. Jean Ping, visited China at the
invitation of the Chinese governments. Whether these
initiatives reflect a trend towards greater involvement of PanAfrican and African regional economic communities in AfricaSouth dialogue is hard to say at this point.192
2. Actively Explore Opportunities in Other Less Advanced
Developing Countries
Africa must explore opportunities for trade and investment
192. During his visit, Dr. Ping “reiterated the commitment and availability
of the African Union to work with the Chinese Government to ensure the
coordination and development of our common ideals,” but did not appear to
push China on emerging concerns surrounding Sino-Africa relations. See Press
Release, AfriBiz: Making Business Happen in Africa, AU Chairman Ping
Concludes
Visit
to
China
(Nov.
3,
2010),
available
at
http://www.afribiz.info/content/au-chairman-ping-concludes-visit-to-chinapress-release.
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beyond the BRIC economies. Africa appears to export more
value-added products to places other than the BRIC countries.
The 2009 report by UNCTAD found that the share of low,
medium, and high technology manufactures in Africa’s export
to developing countries such as Republic of Korea and Saudi
Arabia was higher than 10% in 2008. Conversely, the
continent’s export to the advanced developing countries of
similar manufactures during the same period was no more than
4%. Africa’s share in the trade of many developing countries is
still minimal and could be significantly improved. Africa’s trade
represents only 10.6% of China’s total trade, 3.5% of India’s,
2.6% of Brazil’s, and a mere 1.2% of Russia’s external trade.
Africa has to move beyond resolutions and declarations at highlevel meetings towards identifying specific ways to exploit the
opportunities in South-South trade. Both the direction and the
content of Africa’s trade must change. Consequently, Africa
must pressure Southern partners to address barriers to African
manufactures in their markets. Conversely, countries in Africa
must also address internal constraints to industrialization. As
the President of Tanzania rightly noted, “Without value
addition [Africa is] doomed.”193 Regarding Africa-Asia trade,
the Tanzanian President suggests that the relationship must
“move increasingly beyond trade, to include trade-related
investments.”194 Three types of investment are especially
needed: investments directed at producing in Africa consumer
goods for Asian markets, investments directed at producing in
Africa consumer goods for Western markets, and investments
targeted at producing locally produced goods for African
domestic markets. Although countries in Africa routinely make
demands of developed countries, they appear more hesitant to
make demands on other developing countries, including
advanced developing countries.195
Exploring opportunities in developing countries’ markets
also means developing the capacity to identify tariff and nontariff barriers to Africa’s exports in these markets and
providing support to African enterprises attempting to
193. The President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Speech to the AU
Comm’n, Addis Ababa, Eth. (Aug. 31, 2005).
194. Id.
195. See Africa Union, Exec. Council, Decision on Trade Facilitation,
Ex.CL/Dec.204 (VII) (2005) (requesting developed countries to “introduce
measures that will encourage trans-national corporations to increase
investment in Africa to ensure that the market access opportunities granted to
the continent result in attracting a steady flow of FDI.”).
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penetrate these new markets. Most countries in the continent
lack the capacity to promptly identify damaging trade barriers
in major export markets and frequently rely on reports from
NGOs or reports to the WTO for relevant information. With
respect to China, foreign exporters generally complain about
inconsistent application of custom classifications, tariff rates,
and import controls by local Chinese officials.196
3. Conditions for Growth
Many accepted conditions for solid and sustained economic
growth are lacking in Africa. These include sound
macroeconomic policies, stable macroeconomic background,
strong and stable political institutions, peace and security,
openness, and high levels of education. Available data suggests
that most countries in Africa fall short on many levels.
Figure 6

Although African leaders routinely express concerns about
the continent’s poor performance in attracting FDI,197 the
political will to take the necessary steps needed to create an
enabling competitive environment is absent. In a 2005
196. Tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers, AUSTL. GOV’T (Mar. 4, 2009),
http://www.austrade.gov.au/Tariffs-and-non-tariff-barriers/default.aspx.
197. Decision on Trade Facilitation, supra note 195, para. 2.
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Decision, the Executive Council of the African Union requested
Member States and the AU Commission to “review the
investment promotion strategies pursued by African countries
in order to eliminate existing constraints to FDI inflows,” and
called on international organizations to “support African
countries to review their investment policies and identify more
focused and targeted investment promotion activities.”198
Considering that most of the constraints to FDI inflow to Africa
are well known and documented in numerous reports, new
studies are not necessary. What is needed is principled and
committed action on a number of fronts.
4. Private Sector Development/SMEs.
Most countries in Africa have yet to recognize the critical
role of the private sector in development and poverty
development and most are yet to adopt appropriate private
sector development strategy. To maximize the opportunities in
South-South trade, Africa needs a vibrant private sector that
boasts strong small and medium sized enterprises that compete
globally.199 To date, most countries in the region lack coherent
and concrete policy directed at strengthening enterprise
competitiveness. UNCTAD Commission on Enterprise,
Business
Facilitation
and
Development
defines
Competitiveness as “a nation’s ability to produce goods and
services that meet the test of international markets while
simultaneously maintaining and expanding real incomes of its
people over the long term.”200 In addition to the basic
prerequisites necessary for private sector development (e.g.,
investment in physical infrastructure and human development,
and a sound legal and regulatory system), there are concrete
steps that each country can take to strengthen enterprise
competitiveness. Specific policies are needed to address the
market failures that prevent SMEs from building
competitiveness. Problems such as a lack of stability and
198. Id. para. 4.
199. See generally World Bank Group: International Finance Corporation,
Where Innovation Meets Impact: IFC Annual Report 2010 (2010) (according to
the International Finance Corporation, the private sector provides more than
90% of jobs, drives innovation, and is also the main source of tax revenue in
most countries).
200. Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), Policy Options for Strengthening SME
competitiveness, U.N. Docs. TD/399, TD/B/COM.3/58, TD/B/COM.3/58/Corr. 1
(Apr. 29, 2004).
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transparency in the legal and regulatory environments,
difficulty accessing information about developing country
markets, the absence of an effective, broad-based, formal,
structured, inclusive, and participatory public-private sector
dialogue, heavy, complex, and costly regulatory burden, and
poor access to finance, information, markets, and technology
must be addressed. Finally, governments need to be proactive
in terms of providing business development services for
SMEs201 and must consider appropriate financial and fiscal
incentives to support SMEs, particularly enterprises in
distressed priority sectors and in the rural areas.202
5. Priority Areas and Industrial Clusters
Governments should also consider identifying and
supporting sectors that have high growth potential and
strengthening selected clusters. In order to increase Tanzania’s
share in the world trade, the Confederation of Tanzanian
Industries have identified six priority sectors which can receive
preferential treatment from the Tanzanian government and
donor community: agro-processing, horticulture, leather and
leather products, furniture, tourism, and mining. These are
sectors that could benefit from appropriate cluster development
programs. Support in the form of research centers, export
promotion boards, and quality certification institutions could
yield huge dividends in the future. The African Export-Import
Bank (Afrexim) could play a greater role in this regard.203
6. Redirected Civil Society Groups: Greater South-South
Interaction and Coordination
Thus far, civil society groups in Africa appear not to be
engaged in the unfolding relations. Preoccupied with basic
human rights, survival, and governance issues, civil society
201. See generally id. (noting that business support services such as
training, consulting, technical and managerial assistance, marketing, physical
infrastructure and policy advocacy can go a long way in helping businesses
compete).
202. There are many options as regards fiscal and financial incentives.
Financial incentives such as grants, subsidized credits and insurance at
preferential rate have worked in many emerging economies. Fiscal incentives
such as reduction or exemption from taxes on profits, imports, and exports
have also proved effective in some countries.
EXPORT-IMPORT
BANK,
203. See
About
Us,
AFRICAN
http://afreximbank.com/afrexim/en/AboutUs.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2011)
(discussing general objectives and goals of the Afrexim bank).
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groups in Africa are marginally interested in global economic
issues and probably lack the time and resources needed to
effectively address the trade and investment issues affecting
the continent. Furthermore, there is presently little SouthSouth interaction between civil society groups in Asia, Africa,
and South America. Civil society groups in Africa are more
connected to similar organizations in Europe and North
America than they are with organizations in other developing
countries. This is a problem that needs to be addressed.
In conclusion, Africa must proactively engage Southern
partners and seek to maximize the opportunities that SouthSouth trade and investment presents bearing in mind potential
dangers and risks in such arrangements. In addition to the
issues discussed above, a host of other issues will need to be
addressed on a national, regional, and continental basis. Other
issues to be addressed include: (i) improving the continent’s
SPS infrastructure by prioritizing SPS investments; (ii)
developing the capacities needed to negotiate new trade and
investment agreements or renegotiate old ones and the capacity
to implement and take advantage of these agreements once
they are concluded; (iii) developing coherent and sophisticated
energy policies taking into account the long-term sustainable
development goals of the different countries in the region.
B. ROLE OF AFRICA’S SOUTHERN PARTNERS
Although South-South trade is on the rise, cooperation at
the interregional level is recognized to be “the weaker link in
South-South trade.”204 Legitimacy and integrity of the SouthSouth framework will depend on how widely and across regions
the success stories emerging from countries in Asia and Latin
America are replicated. The fact that South-South trade is
subject to higher barriers and higher distance and
communication-related costs is a major problem that must be
addressed. The state-centric focus of Africa-South dialogues
raises numerous concerns. Southern partners must involve the
private sector and relevant stakeholders in unfolding dialogues;
they must also encourage the development of decentralized
Africa-South cooperation, that is, cooperation that takes place
outside the purview of central governments and involves local
governments, private sectors, and NGOs.
There is need for collective effort in addressing old and new
204. New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 16 .
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barriers to South-South trade. These barriers include: (a) poor
or non-existent transport and communication facilities;205 (b)
high transport and communication costs;206 (c) bias against
trade among developing countries in financial networks and
currency clearing arrangements;207 (d) the lack of marketing
channels such as specialized importers and wholesalers, in
many developing countries;208 and (e) high levels of protection
in South-South trade.209 Regarding market access barriers,
issues such as high average tariffs, tariff peaks, tariff
escalations, non-tariff barriers, and service trade barriers must
be addressed within the context of the GSTP negotiations and
in bilateral negotiations. Additionally, Southern Governments
must:
 Pay attention to the need to incorporate appropriate and
effective monitoring, evaluation, and follow-up
mechanisms;
 Address process-related issues in the GSTP negotiations
and in broader South-South institutional and
regulatory frameworks to ensure that they are
transparent and inclusive;
 Ensure necessary interface between South-South
arrangements, intra-regional integration agenda, and
the multilateral trading system;
 Ensure coherence between aid and trade by ensuring
that market access barriers to African products are
eliminated and do not neutralize the effectiveness of
the aid and assistance they deliver to Africa.
 Address biases against African goods in their respective
markets including tariff peaks and escalations and
205. See Thomas Straubhaar, South-South Trade: Some Recent Trends,
INTERECONOMICS, Sept.–Oct. 1986, at 244 (“Often transport and
communication facilities are worse between different LDCs than between an
LDC and a DC.”).
206. See id. at 244 (remarking on the oligopolistic trade policies of
internationally operating transport companies in favor of South-North trade
flows).
207. See id. (commenting on the bias against trade among LDCs in
financial networks and currency clearing arrangements).
208. See id. (noting that the missing marketing channels bias distribution
cost against South-South trade because these institutions are much better
developed in the case of North-South trade).
209. See id. The protectionism is understandable given similarity in the
production patterns of developing countries and consequently similar export
goods. This problem may abate as new complementarities are identified and
exploited.
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hidden non-tariff barriers.
As South-South economic cooperation deepens, many
questions and issues will need to be resolved such as:
 What are the core objectives of the South-South agenda
and how do these differ from the objectives of the
multilateral trading system?
 What will be the role of law and institutions in the
South-South framework?
 Will SDT be a fundamental principle of South-South
trade? Should it be?
 Will the South-South framework address issues such as
capacity building, aid for trade, implementation, and
sustainability?
 Will the South-South framework allow any regime of
assessment? What evaluative framework will be
needed or allowed?
C. ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
There is a need to mobilize additional resources to enhance
South-South cooperation. In this respect, multilateral
institutions and donor agencies must to find ways to effectively
mainstream the use of South-South cooperation in the design,
formulation, and implementation of their regular programs.210
Developed countries have a role to play as well.211 Given the
primacy of the North in international economic relations,
South-South trade cannot and must not be seen as a substitute
for North-South trade. At the very least, developed countries
still have a responsibility to address the barriers to African
products in their own markets; barriers such as subsidies, tariff
peaks, and tariff escalations in developed markets have been
found to be dangerous and very destructive of economies and
peoples in Africa.
VII. CONCLUSION
Affirming the idea of a new geography of trade and
investment, the changing landscape of international economic
relations and the growing significance of South-South trade, in
October 2010, the G-20 reached a historical agreement to
210. See G.A. Res. 58/220, supra note 12, ¶ 9 (suggesting that multilateral
institutions consider increasing allocations of human, technical, and financial
resources for supporting South-South cooperation initiatives).
211. See New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 14.
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radically reform the IMF’s quota and governance.
Acknowledging the increasing role of emerging developing
countries (EMDCs) in global governance, the G-20 proposal
calls for shifts in quota shares to dynamic EMDCs, a
comprehensive review of the voting formula by January 2013 to
better reflect the economic weights, and greater representation
for EMDCs on the IMF’s Executive Board.212 South-South trade
offers viable opportunities for countries in Africa to eradicate
poverty and achieve rapid and sustainable economic growth
and development.213 Indeed, South-South cooperation “can have
a positive impact on global, regional and national policies and
actions in the economic, social and development fields in the
developing countries.”214 Increasingly, Southern partners,
particularly China, present themselves and are increasingly
viewed as viable alternatives to Western primacy in Africa.
Although South-South trade and investment is on the
upward trend, the success is not widely replicated and Africa is
not yet part of that success story. And, although studies
suggest that South-South trade provides opportunity for
developing countries, particularly LDCs, to diversity their
export and export high skill content manufactures, the benefits
of South-South trade are not automatic.215 Most of the growth
and expansion has been limited to a few countries in Asia and
Latin America. Only 27% of South-South trade in agriculture
and 12% of South-South trade in manufacturing is conducted
on an interregional basis. According to Ambassador Munir
Akram of Pakistan, one-time chair of the Group of 77, despite
accounts of success, “[a] great number of developing countries,
in particular the least developed, the landlocked and the small
island developing states, are still confronted with poverty.”
Whether South-South trade can be the engine for sustained
economic growth, diversification, poverty reduction, and
employment in Africa still remains to be seen. African leaders
must immediately address rowing asymmetries in Africa-South
212. Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20), Gyeongju, S. Kor., Oct. 23, 2010, Communiqué, ¶ 5.
213. See generally G.A. Res. 58/220, supra note 12 (noting the economic
opportunities afforded by South-South trade cooperation).
214. Id. ¶ 4.
215. See Bailey Klinger, Is South-South Trade a Testing Ground for
Structural Transformation? 17 (U.N. Conf. on Trad & Dev., Pol’y Issues in
Int’l Trade & Commodities Study Series No. 40, 2009) (concluding that SouthSouth trade could be a testing ground for structural transformation in some
countries but not in others).
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relations. In this regard, the continued dominance of
commodities in Africa’s export is a major concern because,
“Africa’s heavy commodity-dependence has accounted largely
for the continued marginalization of the continent in the global
economy and trade and for its limited gains from the process of
globalization.”216 Although Africa’s export to non-African
developing countries has grown, these exports are not growthenhancing and do not offer the type of learning opportunities
that can fuel structural transformation. Given the present
composition of Africa’s export, South-South trade may not
provide the needed opportunity for countries in Africa to
diversify their export, access new markets, and export more
value-added manufacture.
This paper focused on trade and investment cooperation
between Africa and other Southern partners. However, SouthSouth cooperation encompasses much more than trade and
investment. Ultimately, South-South learning and cooperation
“is about developing countries working together to find
solutions to common development challenges.”217 Seen in this
broader context, there is a lot that Africa can benefit from
South-South arrangements. South-South cooperation provides
opportunity for countries in the continent to diversify and
expand their development options, build new partnerships in a
broad range of issues, and gain greater voice in global
governance. The paper identifies promising avenues for further
investigation and empirical work: the main barriers to African
export in key developing countries, the cost of barriers to
African export in key developing country markets, the potential
benefit to Africa of preference schemes by developing countries,
the level of technology transfer occurring in the context of
Africa-South cooperation, etc.
In conclusion, whether the journey on the South-South
train will be smooth, rapid, and beneficial for peoples and
countries in Africa will depend on African countries, other
Southern partners, and the international community at large.
As the foreign policy toolkit of countries like China and India
become more sophisticated, Africa’s response must also become
more coordinated, sophisticated, and directed at addressing the
216. Elizabeth Tankeu, Comm’r for Trade & Indus., Statement at the
Opening Session of the Seminar on African Commodities: Problems and
Strategic Options (Nov. 16–18, 2005).
217. Ajay Tejasvi, South-South Capacity Development: The Way to Grow?,
WORLD BANK INST., Feb. 2007, at 1.
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continent’s long term development objectives. Although
emerging trends are discouraging, there is ample opportunity
for change. As policy makers in the South acknowledge, “[T]he
responsibility for enhancing South-South trade and economic
cooperation lies with developing countries themselves.”218

218. New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 13.

